AT THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
WOMEN OF COLOUR ON TERROR

Edited by SuVendrini Perera and Sherene H. Razack
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In January 2010, newspapers carried a series of stories about homeless Chihuahuas in California being rescued and flown to new homes around North America— from New York City to Houston to Edmonton. In one case, Virgin Airlines donated $12,000 in travel costs for the dogs and their human companions. These flights— termed “Chihuahua airlifts” — were organized by philanthropists in concert with the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA); in one case, the New York Times wrote that “15 homeless dogs from the Bay Area were flown to Kennedy by the airline so they could be adopted by New Yorkers.” Another article stated that “animal lovers are determined to rescue those that they can from a sad and lonely life in a shelter in California.” Upon arrival, they were given behavioural and medical assessments to make sure they had adjusted and were fit for adoption. There were people lined up waiting for the arrival of these dogs, because as one of them said, many “may come from puppy mills or brokers where they often live in horrible conditions.”

Another story was carried in May 2010, about a two-year-old female pit bull who had been doused with gasoline and set on fire in Baltimore. A young policewoman happened to notice the smoke and put out the flames with her sweater, but the dog, subsequently named Phoenix, survived for only four days, having received burns over 95 per cent of her body. The story was picked up in a matter of hours and disseminated nationwide in newspapers, on radio and TV, and on websites. The intensity of the response was striking: people responded by offering a $26,000 reward for the culprits; others held a candlelight vigil.

I begin with these stories foregrounding the suffering and rescue of animals because I want to think about whose lives are grievable today. This requires simultaneously asking whose suffering is narrated in the dominant media, what types of violence are rendered visible, and hence what compels action in terms of either care or struggles for justice. I write this in the context of the ongoing global War on Terror, which has structured the visibility of suffering, rendering the violence done to the gendered and racialized bodies targeted by war impossible to perceive as such. First among these are Muslim bodies. It has created a world where the divide between those who are considered human (as the Bush administration stated, those “who are with us”) and those who are expelled from that category (those “who are against us”) is stark. As Puar and Rai have suggested, those who are excluded are not just lesser humans — they have become “monster”; these figures are both racial and sexual outcasts or “abnormals,” half-human, half-animal. These monsters cannot suffer; their pain is unthinkable.

In thinking about the visibility of suffering in the context of the War on Terror, I want to take a closer look at the politics of humanity and inhumanity. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I will discuss what I see as an expanding politics of both humanity and humanitarianism (as the politics of humanity that focuses on care and rescue), which I will argue have grown in scale to include non-humans, to the ecological and even planetary level. I want to think about what this expansion means: Which lives does it newly recognize? And which lives does it cast aside? So far, the most productive analyses of the War on Terror have engaged theories of race, empire, gender, and sexuality to help explain its workings. Yet there is also a burgeoning literature on how the politics of nature and the human–nonhuman divide are central to the War on Terror. For instance, cultural geographer Jake Kosek shows how bees’ capacities for detection and intelligence gathering have been harried by the US Department of Homeland Security, to be used as detection devices. Indeed, they work alongside dogs that in turn work with soldiers to detect mines in the Middle East.

I want to build on these frames of analysis that bring the language of ecology alongside those of race and empire. This chapter will suggest that we need to pay careful attention to new and expanding discourses and technologies of humanity, for they are changing the terms and sites of both war and politics. My underlying argument is that we need to understand more about these new, seemingly unrelated sites in order to know how to make room for those whose lives have thus far not been “apprehendable.” This chapter will first discuss the logic of an
expanding politics of humanity and humanitarianism; then it will investigate one technology that I see as part of this expanding regime of care – veterinary forensic science – to think about the consequences and effects of such expansions. I will end by trying to understand the politics involved in this potentially planetary humanitarianism and what it means for lives touched by the War on Terror.

The Expanding Politics of Humanitarianism

First, before thinking of new technologies of humanity, I want to examine what I see as an expanding politics of humanitarianism. For this, let me return to the stories of animal rescue, which are becoming increasingly common in American media – indeed, the storyline is familiar. The victims being rescued here resemble those at the heart of humanitarian narratives: poor starving children, innocent women. These stories are powerful; as many scholars have shown, humanitarian narratives helped shape the subject of humanity that we now understand as “human,” joining humanity with its cognate, humane. That is, as Thomas Laqueur has argued, in the late eighteenth century, the human began to be conceived not as a physiological fact, but as “ethical subject – the protagonist – of humanitarian narrative.”9s “Humanity” referred to this shared sentiment of sympathy or benevolence – which did not necessarily mean shared species or biological fact. As Lynn Festa writes in her discussion of humanitarian sensibility, also in the eighteenth century, “sentimentality is a literary form: a rhetorical structure designed both to incite feelings in readers and to direct those feelings towards their ‘proper’ objects.”10 Yet with the humanitarian narrative, this sentimental form rests on an unstable definition of humanity – it relies on its malleability. On the one hand, the lack of rigorous definition of the human allows for an expansion of the types of life it includes; on the other, because of the instability at the heart of the sentimental literary form, it can work on a case-by-case basis, providing a poor or inconsistent basis for ethics.11

If the content of this sentimental form is flexible, what precisely evokes this compassion today? What makes one type of content more compelling than another? The more recent histories and anthropologies of humanitarianism suggest that while humanitarianism is premised on the moral imperative to relieve suffering, whatever its cause, form, or context (at least in the form perhaps best embodied by Médecins sans Frontières), the innocent victim is often the most morally legitimate sufferer.12 Children are perhaps the most exemplary humanitarian subjects today – the archetypal innocent victims. It is no accident that children are the face of humanitarianism in fund-raising and publicity campaigns; they serve as generic human subjects, outside time and place. Women, too, can more easily inhabit this position of innocent victim, although this gendered subject is also clearly a racialized one, in that (certain) women of the global south or “Third World” are perceived as the most innocent (read, passive) victims in need of rescue from their (barbaric) men or “cultures.”13

The politics of humanitarianism has entailed both the search for and the production of innocent victims, since the “pure” victim is a placeholder, always just out of reach. There are child soldiers, for instance, as Liisa Malkki points out, which troubles the image of the child as innocent. Indeed, child soldiers are seen as an abomination, a category mistake that leads to them being labelled “youth” or “teens” as opposed to “children” whenever possible, to set aside and protect a time of innocence, when they are still unworliday and untainted.14 Similarly, the recent focus on victims of human trafficking pictures young girls or women who have been abducted from their homes and locked away in brothels; yet this picture of innocence too is complicated when we realize that many of these girls or women who engage in sex work actually chose to leave home and generally knew what they would be doing, even if they did not know the exact conditions of their employment. Here, the victim is implicated in her own situation of exploitation, and her status quickly shifts from endangered to dangerous, innocent to delinquent. For women, innocence is still inextricably tied to sexual innocence.

Insofar as humanitarianism depends on the figure of the innocent victim as the highest moral good – the goal driving humanitarian action, in an attempt to steer clear of explicit political solutions or goals – I suggest that it works through a logic of expansion, in which new territories of innocence must be discovered and incorporated. The innocent sufferer can never be isolated for long enough to keep it uncorrupted by history or context. In this sense, humanitarianism is constantly displacing politics to the limit of innocence, a border that must be drawn and redrawn.

While animals are selectively incorporated into this politics of humanity in these new ways – and of course the flip side and in the larger context for this is the overwhelming nature of institutions and practices like factory farming and animal experimentation, which touch billions
of animals, leaving just a tiny few to be saved – I do not mean to suggest that they represent a novel terrain of innocence; they have been variously included in and excluded from this category of universal solidarity over time. In the eighteenth century, the sentimental mode that eventually turned into abolitionism was “notoriously indiscriminate in its choice of objects, embracing not only human beings but lapdogs, dying birds, and (as one eighteenth-century critic grumbled), ‘efts, toads, bats, every thing that hath life.’”16 Indeed, Joanna Bourke writes how in 1872, a woman known as “the Earnest Englishwoman” asked to let women “become animal” – that is, to be treated as animals – in order to reap the benefits they were denied because they were not part of “mankind.”17 So what is new here, how has this politics expanded?

Insofar as the content of humanity – its sentimental community – has always been unstable, alternately including and excluding subjects depending on the changing “distributions of sentiment,”18 I turn to examine the new technologies that help produce humanity as a category and that help sustain this particular project of sentiment. Why technology?

In his discussion of the relationship between terrorists and humanity, Faisal Derji,19 following Hannah Arendt, suggests that “global humanity” was produced by the very technology that enabled its destruction – that is, the atom bomb. This technology helped “humanity” emerge as a global historical actor for the first time. In this sense, global humanity cannot be understood outside the technologies that helped produce it. Ecological, biological, and other threats have replaced the nuclear threat that initially gave meaning to this category, but they share and perpetuate the logic of a technologically interdependent humanity – a humanity that I want to suggest is being constructed on a planetary level now, in relation to emerging politics of war and security, ethics and technologies, and new forms of capital.

Veterinary Forensic Science

In this remainder of this chapter, I will focus on one emergent technology: veterinary forensic science. Forensic science – meaning the use of science to answer legal questions – has been expanding in scope and relevance in recent years; this has been accompanied by the development of new subfields (such as linguistic forensics), as well as an increased public focus, evinced by television shows such as CSI (Crime Scene Investigation). As part of this expansion, veterinary forensic science is a new subfield of scientific expertise, inaugurated in 2008 at the University of Florida with the support of the ASPCA. The goal in applying forensic sciences to veterinary medicine is to “aid in the understanding, prevention and prosecution of animal cruelty.” This new set of experts is mobilized around identifying, measuring, and alleviating animal suffering and helping promote animal and human health and welfare. These veterinarians are some of the new players who are helping adjudicate and manage humanitarian interventions.

We may seem to be moving into a terrain that feels far from the War on Terror and our discussion of whose lives are grievable, but this is precisely the point: these emergent sciences and technologies are at the frontier of this war. They are part of new arsenals of technology such as those funded by DARPA, which researches robots modelled on insects, including cyborg insects (“cybugs”) that see, hear, and potentially attack in remote battlefields.20 These veterinary experts are part of new regimes of humanitarianism that decide whose lives are grievable and whose suffering is recognizable; and as part of new regimes of humanitarianism, they are implicated in regimes of security and violence. Much literature has shown that humanitarianism is inevitably accompanied by its seeming opposite, whether this is understood as policing, security, or militarism.21 This link is exhibited in many ways: both humanitarianism and its flip side rely on and sustain the logic of crisis or emergency, with its focus on the temporal present and the state of exception; this idea of crisis is central to the War on Terror. Humanitarianism also often follows on the heels of and smooths over the damage wrought by military intervention.22 But perhaps most importantly, humanitarian institutions increasingly work directly in concert with security forces, implicitly or explicitly, intentionally or not: they may hire private security forces – often former military personnel who participated in other conflicts – to protect their officers, or they may come together to form military–humanitarian interventions, for instance, as prompted by the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine.23 In what follows, we see this same complementarity of regimes of humanitarianism and security present in the new veterinary forensic science. First, we will look at how this and other technologies expand regimes of rescue; then we will turn to see how they simultaneously help develop new logics of criminality and security.
A. On Rescue

Veterinary forensic scientists work in new “humanitarian” teams: they join with disaster response teams, emergency animal services, and animal relief. For instance, veterinary forensic scientists work with the American Humane Association (AHA), which has a disaster response team. One of the AHA’s most recent projects was an attempted large-scale animal rescue operation in Japan, in response to the earthquake and tsunami. Interestingly, illustrating my earlier point about the categories of innocence and their expansion, the AHA protects both animals and children, focusing on promoting their interconnected well-being. Veterinary forensic scientists also work with the National Animal Rescue and Response Team, formed in 2006, when disasters like Hurricane Katrina “impacted more people and their companion animals than in the history of the United States.” Other veterinary forensic scientists have gone with humanitarian teams to Haiti. These groups and experts engage with the same emergency medical techniques and technologies as other (human) emergency response teams, working on a model of crisis and with the same structures and logics. This fulfills a moral purpose for the humanitarian, regardless of what it does for the animal. An innocent other is required to enact these humanitarian politics (insofar as it is a politics of suffering/politics of humanity) – that is, an innocent other provides the subject of sympathy or pity as well as the moral imperative to act. We must ask here what it means that the resources (financial, emotional, mediatic, and so on) dedicated to this moral purpose are now going increasingly to animal rescue – and what it means for other types of suffering and violence. Will they be rendered ever more marginal, less and less recognizable?

B. On Criminality

Veterinary forensic scientists collect medical evidence not just to document or help relieve suffering, but to be used in legal cases. When we look from the angle of the courtroom, we see a different impact of this expertise and a different interaction with humans and humanity. These veterinarians have played a role in the shift in focus towards animal cruelty. In the United States before 1990, only six states had felony provisions in their animal cruelty laws; now forty-six states do. While there are several reasons for this change in animal cruelty laws – including changing perceptions of animals as part of larger kinship structures, as innocent victims, and as rights-bearing subjects (most recently, dolphins were voted to have the right to legal personhood by the American Association for the Advancement of Science) – one reason that stands out is the belief that acts of animal cruelty are linked to other crimes more narrowly related to humans.24

In particular, the link between animal abuse and interpersonal violence has received a lot of recent attention,25 and the links have been substantiated such that many US communities now cross-train social service and animal control agencies in how to recognize animal abuse as a possible indicator of other abusive behaviours. A 1997 study of forty-eight of the largest domestic violence and child abuse shelters in the United States found that 85 per cent of women who came also reported incidents of animal abuse26 and one quarter of battered women delayed going into shelters for fear of the well-being of family pets. Some shelters have adapted, offering refuge to abused pets as well as to people. As with pediatricians who must notify the police if they suspect child abuse, veterinarians must notify the police if they suspect abuse in the animals they treat. In fact, animal control officers are now on the list of those bound by law to report suspected child abuse; not only that, but several districts and states in the United States have created online registries that resemble those for sex offenders, tracking animal abusers across county and state lines, with the idea that this will serve as an early warning system for other crimes.27

We can see how this type of veterinary forensic expertise actually works as a new diagnostic of human cruelty or criminality. While the laws are in place to protect against animal cruelty or to protect endangered species, in many ways this has allowed for new ways to patrol and discipline humans and their relationships with one another; it also allows for new ways to configure who is exemplary of humanity and who falls on its outer edges – who newly becomes animal or monster. For instance, veterinary forensic science was instrumental in convicting NFL quarterback Michael Vick for running a dog-fighting ring. A forensic veterinarian found evidence in “mass graves” on his property where eight pit bulls were buried that corroborated statements by witnesses that the dogs had been killed by hanging, shooting, drowning, or slamming them to the ground. Vick was sentenced to twenty-three months in jail on a felony charge for his role in the ring, with the judge remarking that Vick had not accepted full responsibility for “promoting, funding and facilitating this cruel and inhumane sporting activity.”
We should take the role of race seriously here, even though a full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this chapter. As one example of this, his punishment, as some have noted, exceeded that given to others for charges of rape. In other words, when Vick was convicted for animal cruelty, he was being charged by the same American courtrooms that send one in three black men to prison; yet this does not enter the frame of the conviction.

Similarly, there are those like former French actress Brigitte Bardot—who also draws on veterinary expertise to make her point, and who has used the treatment of animals to mark and exclude Muslims in France. Suggesting that the ritualistic sacrifice of sheep for Eid is “unspeakable” and “undignified,” her discourse contributes to an already anti-immigrant discourse that uses terms such as inhumane, uncivilized, and barbaric to describe Muslims. Muslims, in this discourse, exemplify new forms of animality. In the latest round of French elections (in the spring of 2012), far-right candidate Marine Le Pen used halal meat and the killing of animals as a cornerstone of her campaign, which helped her attract the biggest vote for a far-right candidate in recent history: 18 per cent in the first round.

The War on Terror works by playing with the boundaries of the human, and working with the discourse of race; this is how certain bodies are made killable. This was already demonstrated in the colonial era, when in southern Africa, the treatment of people like animals became the treatment of people as animals—revealing an ontological shift. As historian Clapperton Mavhunga writes, the pesticides used to exterminate vermin in order to help agricultural development soon became the same technologies used to exterminate guerrillas fighting for independence, with the understanding that they, too, were subhuman “vermin beings” from which the white race needed to be protected. As Kosek states, “What it is to be human is a product of the shifting cartography of what it is to be animal.”

C. On Security

There is yet another side of veterinary forensics: these new experts are concerned with biosecurity and bioterrorism that targets animals or agriculture, as well as with emerging diseases—in particular, zoonoses, which are diseases and infections transmitted naturally between vertebrate animals and humans. Forensic veterinarians investigate zoonoses that affect humans and animals; most recently, they have been concerned with emerging infections, from BSE (mad cow disease) to the Ebola and Marburg diseases. We can recognize here an expanded or altered version of what Andy Lackoff has called “global health governance,” which combines humanitarian technologies with logics of biosecurity. Yet what we see here is that this field of global health has expanded to include a new ecological field and to produce new notions of what might constitute “health.”

As I see it, this is where the humanity project changes scales. These various technologies and forms of expertise such as veterinary forensic science that expand the terrain of humanitarianism, meet in the emergent form of “One Health,” which incorporates the health of humans, animals, and plants and treats them in relationship to one another. Still relatively amorphous, the “One Health” concept is being developed at the level of international multilateral organizations, governments, NGOs, private organizations, and individuals as well as educational institutions.

“One Health” came into being primarily to counter zoonotic threats, which are on the rise—supposedly, three quarters of emerging infections originated in animals. SARS, avian flu, and the West Nile virus are just a few examples. But as one of the founders, Dr Laura Kahn, stated in an interview, it is not new that human and animal health are linked; rather, “It struck me how many of the bioterrorist agents and emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic ... Yet in my research, I found that physicians and veterinarians rarely, if ever, communicated or collaborated with each other.” In other words, bioterrorism and concerns over preparedness are a driving force for this new collaboration, even if it may now claim other, more innocuous goals as well, such as improving the lives of all species—human, animal, and plant—by integrating human medicine, veterinary medicine, and environmental science. Ultimately, One Health focuses on health at the individual, population, and ecosystem levels, moving both humanitarianism and health from the level of the population to the level of the planet.

Planetary Politics?

What kind of politics is this expanded, potentially planetary politics of humanitarianism, one that inflates the subject population while maintaining a focus on innocence and suffering? What technologies of power does it rely on? Is this a politics that promises to expand our vision of life, of who is recognized as well as apprehended? Will it bring trans-species connections, new biosocial collectivities, or political
solidarities? Does it have the potential to remake Otherness – to let in those erased by the War on Terror?

There are several possibilities. First, we might ask if this is simply a new form of biopolitics, one that expands the power over life. On the one hand, we could say that thinking in biopolitical terms is no longer appropriate here. Foucault's notion of biopower referred to the regulation of a national population, constituted and managed as "society." This expanded politics of humanitarianism is no longer about the nation-state; indeed, it is no longer just about the human – or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the terms by which one decides who belongs to humanity have shifted radically.

On the other hand, we could modify notions of biopower in order to think about this type of politics. New notions of biopolitical have been proposed that allow for such visions. For instance, in discussing the biodiversity census, political theorist Rafi Youatt suggests that it will help construct new ideas of a multilayered and multispecies global community. He proposes an ecological view of biopower, one that gives non-human actors active roles. Insofar as biopower moves into the subjective lives of biological species, their actions and transmutations in turn transform biopower. Youatt argues that through the global biodiversity census, different biosocial collectivities can be forged – rather than being grounded on radical human/non-human difference (difference in capacity), they could be based on difference in ecological function. This biopolitics could "reterritorialize the category of the human," grounding it relative to other species and to local ecosystems that make up the global ecosystem.

Italian philosopher Roberto Esposito also proposes an "affirmative biopolitics" more generally, which is a politics of life instead of a politics over life. In suggesting that we can move beyond the stalemate between immunity and community (immunitas and communitas) – a dyad that always creates an outside, an Other, against whom one must be protected or immunized – Esposito argues that through the continual deconstruction of any normative system (a community where there are certain norms to follow), one can defend the difference of life forms with their associated norms. This offers a critique of Otherness, which inevitably results in immunization from the implicit threat of contagion and death. This focus on difference (and not Otherness) is the basis for change and for elaborating a radical tolerance towards the world, which is understood as a multiplicity of different living forms. An affirmative biopolitics "takes place when we recognize that harming one part of life or one life harms all lives" – for Esposito, all lives are inscribed in bios.

Can we see the beginnings of an affirmative biopolitics or ecological biopower in the expanded technologies and politics of suffering just discussed? This is ultimately an empirical question, but from this brief look, it seems that One Health and other technologies such as veterinary forensic science are built on the idea of security, protection, and immunization, albeit at a different scale, one that has expanded in the types of subjects and populations it protects, disciplines, and controls. While they may respond to injury or suffering of innocent victims, in some senses, this recognition of what Butler might call the "social vulnerability of bodies" is often simultaneously structured around the threats of bioterrorism, zoonoses, or disasters. If we return to Arendt's notion that global humanity was first produced as a substantive category by the threat of destruction, then we can argue that this expanded politics of humanity follows in the same footsteps.

Yet do these technologies offer possibilities for new types of collectives, new kinds of social formations? When animals are treated and protected as victims, they are (as with humans) largely perceived as passive; they are spoken for and responded to in the terms of the humanitarians. As with humans, this presumes and imposes a commonality that may or may not exist – it does not leave open the possibility for radical alterity. This was shown quite vividly with the story of a woman who adopted a chimpanzee (subsequently named Travis) and treated him as a son. Travis lived like a human for fourteen years – eating steak, drinking wine, even acting in commercials. Everyone around town knew him. One terrible day, however, he became hostile and attacked and mauled a family friend, biting and clawing off her face and hands. The police were called, and an officer fatally shot Travis. The police officer went into a crippling depression afterwards, related to the shooting of Travis, whom he had known for years, and whose devastating violence haunted him. The police officer was initially denied the worker's compensation claims he could have made had his depression been caused by shooting a human suspect. The Stamford police ended up covering his therapy costs when the police unions got involved; subsequently, State Senator Andrew J. MacDonald (from Stamford) introduced legislation that would cover an officer's compensation for mental or emotional impairment after killing an animal when under threat of deadly force.
What is difficult to think here in all the coverage of the tragic event is that Travis was not a human, but a chimpanzee—his difference was not acknowledged in his life or in his death. Here, there is no space for the non-innocent animal. This erasure of difference can be understood in some senses as a politics of displacement, where the push is to incorporate the extreme externalities (where the external still remains industrial/factory farming but now includes other subjects and objects as well). Of course, it can also be seen as a form of colonial expansion, not just in terms of the profits to be made from new subjects of crime, but also in terms of colonizing new landscapes to produce innocent victims, reproducing a certain sentimental political project of “protection” in the process—a “predatory compassion,” one might say.

So where do we end? Whose lives are grievable, whose suffering is notable? Will this expanded form of humanitarianism eventually help disturb our own assumptions about our ontological status as humans, eventually producing a very different planetary set of relationships and individuals? While it might have seemed that narrating new forms of suffering could render visible many lives—especially those touched by terror—we can see that expanding the category of humanity is not an easy or straightforward answer; the desire to open up the category to let in the excluded is matched by similar neoliberal, neocolonial, and capitalist desires to expand and incorporate. We need to find new ways to render visible violence and injustice that refuse a focus on innocence.

NOTES
1 Siebert, “The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome.”
2 Bustamente, “Airlift Rescues Abandoned LA Chihuahuas.”
3 Bustamente, “Airlift Rescues Abandoned LA Chihuahuas.”
4 Siebert, “The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome.”
5 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag.”
7 Kosek, “Ecologies of Empire.”
8 Butler, Frames of War.
10 Festa, “Humanity without Feathers,” 7.
11 Festa, “Humanity without Feathers,” 5.

12 Ticktin, Casualties of Care.
13 Much feminist postcolonial theory has demonstrated this; see, for example, Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes”; Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”; Razack, “Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution”; and Kapur, “The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric.”
15 Again, I’m referring to humanitarian action largely as a response to emergency in terms of basic human health, exemplified by MSF.
16 Festa, “Humanity without Feathers,” 5.
17 Bourke, What It Means to Be Human.
18 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain.
19 Devji, The Terrorist in Search of Humanity.
21 On humanitarianism and policing, see, for instance, Ticktin Casualties of Care; and Ticktin, “Policing and Humanitarianism in France.” On compassion and its counterpart, repression, see Fassin, “Compassion and Repression.” On humanitarianism as the left hand of empire, see Agier, “Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects.” On the relationships between humanitarianism and militarism, see Fassin and Pandolfi, Contemporary States of Emergency.
22 Agier, “Humanity as an Identity.”
23 Pandolfi, “Laboratory of Intervention.”
24 Siebert, “The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome”; see also Cooper and Cooper, Introduction to Veterinary and Comparative Forensic Medicine.
25 See, for instance, Kurst-Swanger, “Animal Abuse.” There are also many newspaper reports about this.
27 Suffolk County on Long Island in New York was the first to create a registry, but California was the first state to bring such a bill to the legislature, in February 2010. The most recent is Arizona’s House Bill 2310, which, again, would create a registry of “convicted animal abusers similar to the state’s current sex offender one.” Visit http://www.abc15.com/dpp/news/regionPhoenixMetro/centralphoenix/az-bill-would-treatanimal-abusers-like-sex-offenders#ixzz23NGd5zy9. See also “Lawmakers Consider an Animal Abuse Registry,” New York Times, 21 February 2010; as well as Siebert, “The Animal-Cruelty Syndrome.”
28 Mavhunga, “Vermis Beings.”
30 Lakoff, “Two Regimes of Global Health.”
31 Among many others, the following promote the One Health concept: the World Bank, the World Organization for Animal Health, WHO (World Health Organization), FAO (Food and Agricultural Organization), the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the European Commission, the American Veterinary Association, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, and the One Health Center at the University of California’s Global Health Institute. http://www.onehealthinitiative.com.
33 From One Health mission statement: http://www.onehealthinitiative.com
34 Butler, Frames of War.
35 Youatt, “Counting Species,” 405.
36 As Dominic Pettman asks in Human Error, however, who is giving agency here? Non-humans play roles dictated by humans.
37 Esposito, Bios; Campbell, “Bios, Immunity, Life,” 16.
38 Esposito, Bios; Campbell, “Bios, Immunity, Life,” 16.
39 Butler, Frames of War.
40 See, for instance, Lee, “Travis the Menace.” There were many reports about Travis.
41 See also Ahuja, “Abu Zubaydah and the Caterpillar,” on how non-human life gets incorporated into the war on terror.