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CHAPTER 19

Cultural Psychology of Moral Development

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Morality is central to culture. As noted by Shweder, "culture" involves "community-specific ideas about what is true, good, beautiful and efficient that are . . . constitutive of different ways of life, and play a part in the self-understanding of members of the community" (1999, p. 212). Whereas it is widely agreed that culture involves shared moral commitments (e.g., D'Andrade, 1984; Strauss & Quinn, 1997), the issue of whether morality is culturally variable remains controversial. The concern is raised by many psychological theorists that acknowledging cultural variability in morality leads to the stance of an extreme moral relativism, and that cultural approaches to morality embody passive views of the individual (e.g., Turiel, 2002). Work from the perspective of cultural psychology challenges this conclusion. Documenting qualitative cultural variation in moral outlooks, this work draws implications for expanding basic psychological theory in the area of morality, addressing challenges about how to understand moral development in ways that both avoid extreme moral relativism and embody a dynamic view of the individual and culture.

The goal of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis of research on culture and morality, identifying contributions of work in this domain. The first section presents an overview of mainstream psychological theories of moral development, with a focus on understanding why, despite their attention to cultural issues, theorists in this tradition reject the idea of any significant cultural variation as existing in moral outlooks. This is followed by an overview of key theoretical assumptions of cultural psychology, as well as a review of empirical work documenting cultural variation in moral outlooks. In turn, the final section of the chapter identifies new directions for research on moral development.

APPROACHES TO MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN MAINSTREAM TRADITION

Psychological approaches to moral development tend to treat morality as based on criteria that individuals perceive to be above social consensus, rather than merely on rules, norms, or other societal standards. It is assumed that the issues individuals consider to be moral are concerns that they regard as involving right or wrong, and as going beyond what is merely normative or socially accepted. Thus, from this

perspective, it is recognized that morality transcends societal standards and differs from mere social conventions. However, although these assumptions about the formal criteria defining morality are widely shared, controversy exists concerning the content issues that individuals invest with moral force. Whereas it is assumed within work in cultural psychology that the content of morality shows significant cultural variation, the content of morality is assumed to be universal within mainstream psychological viewpoints.

Discussion below focuses on the theoretical models of moral development forwarded in the most clearly developed and influential mainstream psychological theories of morality: the cognitive-developmental framework of Kohlberg, the distinct domain perspective of Turiel, and the morality of caring framework of Gilligan. Although the theories differ in their views of the content of morality and of the ontogenetic processes through which morality arises, they share a stance of defining morality as emerging through developmental processes that do not depend on cultural input and of downplaying the role of culturally variable content assumptions as impacting on moral codes.

Cognitive-Developmental Model of Kohlberg

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental model of moral development has been the most conceptually influential framework in the field, inspiring most of the later work that followed (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971, 1981). The model grounds morality in philosophical arguments that Kohlberg saw as providing an objective basis for morality and is distinguished by its formulation of a compelling stage model. Groundbreaking in its time and dominating research on moral development in developmental psychology for many decades, the Kohlbergian model offers a universalistic approach. Strikingly, however, this universalism is based, not on ignoring culture, but on rejecting, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the validity of cultural approaches to morality.

Part of the Cognitive Revolution in psychology and drawing heavily on Piagetian theory, Kohlberg forwarded a model that offered a sharp break with the then-dominant behaviorist and psychoanalytic models of morality (e.g., Berkowitz, 1964; Eysenck, 1961; Freud, 1930). Piaget had rejected behaviorist and maturational approaches because, in his view, they treat knowledge as merely a copy of information supplied by the environment. He furthermore assumed that cultural approaches resemble behaviorist perspectives in embodying a passive view of the child (Piaget, 1932, 1973). Kohlberg adopted these same assumptions, agreeing with the Piagetian premise that the active construction of knowledge is antithetical to cultural learning (Kohlberg, 1971).

However, beyond this concern shared by Kohlberg and Piaget that cultural approaches assume a passive view of development, Kohlberg raised additional concerns about the problematic stance of a relativistic morality that he felt inhered in giving weight to culture. Thus, he criticized the "relativist point of view" held by anthropologists as assuming "the validity of every set of norms for the people whose lives are guided by them" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 159). Citing an argument by Brandt, he maintained that such a stance leads to the condoning of abusive practices merely because of their normative acceptability:

> It does not follow directly from the fact that the Romans approved of infanticide and we do not, that infanticide was really right for them and really wrong for us or that it is neither right nor wrong for everybody. (Brandt, 1959, p. 84; cited in Kohlberg, 1971, p. 159)

Kohlberg also pointed to the logical contradiction of relativistic appeals for tolerance of other people's beliefs as a stance that treats the principle of toleration itself in nonrelative terms.

To construct a universalistic morality, Kohlberg grounded his theoretical model in logical arguments based on Western philosophical premises (Rawls, 1971). Drawing from the Kantian concept of the categorical imperative, Kohlberg argued for the necessity of excluding relationship-based and affective considerations from morality. In this view, to be moral, an outlook must meet the formal criteria of being universally applicable, prescriptive, and capable of being applied in an impartial and impersonal manner. Such a morality is seen as excluding any considerations that relate to one's social position or to any type of affective considerations.

The six-stage developmental sequence of moral development forwarded by Kohlberg

(1969) treats role-related and affective types of considerations as lower forms of reasoning that individuals emphasize at earlier, premoral levels of development. In this model, the most developmentally primitive stance forms the preconventional level, focused on affective and other self-interested concerns, including a stance of avoiding punishment (Stage 1) and of instrumental exchange (Stage 2). In turn, the developmentally more advanced conventional level encompasses relationship and role-related considerations, including a focus on social role expectations (Stage 3) and on the rule of law and other societal-level concerns (Stage 4). Finally, the developmentally highest level, the only level at which reasoning is considered fully moral in nature, includes both a stage focused on individual rights that have been agreed upon by the whole society (Stage 5) and a stage focused on self-chosen principles of justice, human rights, and respect for the dignity of individual persons (Stage 6). The methodology utilized in research on the Kohlbergian model involves presenting individuals with hypothetical moral dilemmas that embody justice issues and assessing individuals' open-ended reasoning in resolving these dilemmas. Although successful in evoking highly reflective moral reasoning, the emphasis in this methodology on the verbal articulation of responses introduces a complexity for children and other populations with limited education.

The Kohlbergian model has been subject to extensive cross-cultural testing that Kohlberg and his colleagues have interpreted as supporting the universality of the Kohlbergian claims, despite the consistent findings of extensive cross-cultural variation in the observed distribution of moral reasoning (Snarey, 1985). Thus, for example, in an early report of cross-cultural findings, Kohlberg (1971) noted that whereas most U.S. respondents by age 16 had reached the postconventional level of moral development, in both Taiwan and Mexico, the dominant form of reasoning reached by this age was only at the conventional level. This type of result showing that higher levels of moral development were only reached in sociocultural communities marked by characteristics such as Westernization, higher education, and urbanization was interpreted as evidence that particular environments are more stimulating than other sociocultural settings and thus push cognitive development faster and further.

This developmental perspective on cultural differences adopted by Kohlberg provided a framework for interpreting the marked cross-cultural differences in moral reasoning as reflecting variation in the individual's rate of development but not in the fundamental concepts that comprise morality. Although critics charged that the Kohlbergian scheme was biased in its grounding in Western liberal, secular cultural assumptions (e.g., Simpson, 1974; Sullivan, 1977) and may have been insufficiently sensitive to the adaptive demands of different sociocultural settings (e.g., Edwards, 1975; Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981) or to response biases linked to socioeconomic status (e.g., Buck-Morss, 1975), theorists in the Kohlbergian tradition remained unmoved by these critiques, finding the evidence of cross-cultural variation to be fully compatible with their claims of a universal developmental progression of justice morality (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). As will be seen in the later discussion of research in cultural psychology, only when the fundamental conceptual assumptions of the Kohlbergian model were subject to a culturally based conceptual broadening were more fundamental cultural challenges to the Kohlbergian model articulated.

Distinct Domain Framework

The distinct domain framework developed originally by Turiel (1983, 1998a), but associated with a growing number of theorists (e.g., Turiel, Smetana, & Killen, 1991; Nucci, 2002; Smetana, 1995), challenges the developmental claims of the Kohlbergian model, while retaining its universalism. The Kohlbergian model portrays the development of moral understandings as involving a process of cognitive differentiation in which individuals hold one dominant form of understanding at any given time, with developmentally more adequate later understandings arising through transformation of developmentally less adequate earlier understandings. Thus, conventional understandings emerge as a replacement for preconventional understandings, and moral understandings emerge as a replacement for conventional understandings. Challenging this view, distinct domain theorists argue, in contrast, that social experience is always multifaceted, with different types of understandings applied to different types of social behaviors. Thus, rather than viewing one type of outlook as replacing an-

other over development, the distinct domain theory maintains that at any given point in development, individuals apply different forms of understanding to different types of social issues.

As in both Kohlbergian and Piagetian theory, theorists in the distinct domain tradition assume that morality centers on content issues involving harm, justice, and individual rights, and that moral development occurs through self-constructive processes that do not depend on cultural input. As in Kohlbergian theory, it is also assumed that cultural approaches to morality inevitably lead to an extreme moral relativism and are antithetical to the active construction of knowledge. In contrast to the Kohlbergian view, however, the self-constructive processes underlying moral judgment are seen as entailing relatively simple inductive judgments rather than the complex deductive judgments assumed within the Kohlbergian framework. It is assumed that issues involving harm and injustice are categorized as moral, issues involving social coordination, as social conventions, and issues that involve neither type of concern are categorized as matters of personal choice.

Methodologically, work within the distinct domain perspective utilizes simplified methodologies for assessing moral reasoning that uncover greater developmental competencies than are apparent with the Kohlbergian protocol (Turiel, 1983). Utilizing child-friendly testing procedures, the methodology focuses on the child's ability to distinguish between different types of social rules, rather than, as in Kohlbergian testing, on their open-ended response justifications. Thus, for example, to assess whether a child categorizes an issue such as hitting in moral terms, short-answer response questions may be asked to assess whether the child treats the rule against hitting as nonchangeable (e.g., "Would it be okay to change this rule?"), non-culturally-relative (e.g., "Would it be okay to have a different rule about this in another school?"), and nonlegitimately subject to regulation (e.g., "Is this the person's own business?").

Research by theorists in the distinct domain tradition has tended to focus on clear-cut "prototypical" issues and to uncover findings that individuals in all cultures have the ability to distinguish between issues of morality, convention, and personal choice, and that this ability is evident in children as young as preschool age (Turiel, 1983, 1998a). Such findings are interpreted as supporting the model's claim that judgments of harm and injustice take a universal form that is unaffected by cultural influences. As I discuss later, however, work within cultural psychology has challenged this conclusion in examining a broader range of types of issues. This latter work, as will be seen, not only provides evidence that conceptions of morality extend beyond issues of harm and justice but also that judgments of harm and justice vary depending on culturally variable content assumptions.

Morality of Caring Framework of Gilligan

The morality of caring framework developed by Gilligan (1977, 1982) offers a compelling cultural critique of Kohlbergian theory, as well as of related assumptions in the distinct domain perspective, both in its argument for the need to treat morality as extending to issues of caring, rather than as limited to the avoidance of harm and injustice, and in its assertion that perspectives on morality are gender-related. However, although conceptually broadening the scope of the moral domain in these ways, the framework retains a universalistic emphasis. The morality of caring is formulated in culturally invariant terms and issues of gender variation treated as fundamentally the same across all cultures.

From the perspective of the morality of caring framework, the argument is made for the need to treat issues of caring in fully moral terms rather than to limit the scope of morality to the prohibition-oriented issues of justice. Drawing on psychodynamic formulations and attachment theory, the perspective maintains that the distinctive socialization experiences of males and females lead to the development of contrasting senses of self and morality (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). In identifying with their mothers and in having experiences in family interaction that emphasize interpersonal responsiveness, girls are seen as developing a connected sense of self and an associated morality of caring. This sense of self and morality, however, becomes problematic at adolescence, when the girl finds that it conflicts with the autonomous sense of self valued in the larger culture. In contrast, although males are seen as attached to their mothers, they are assumed to identify with their fathers. Desiring to overcome the inequality that they experience in re-

lation to their fathers, males are seen as developing an autonomous sense of self and associated morality of justice.

The model assumes that although there exist two rather than only one type of moral perspective (i.e., moralities of both justice and of caring), the form of these perspectives is culturally invariant. As Gilligan argues, "All people are born into a situation of inequality and no child survives in the absence of adult connection. Since everyone is vulnerable both to oppression and to abandonment, two stories about morality recur in human experience" (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988, p. 281). The universality of morality is assumed to reflect the universality of gender-related developmental processes, as well as the cross-culturally common experience of gender bias. Any observed cross-cultural variation in the moralities of caring and of justice is assumed to represent only a minor difference in relative emphasis and not in the basic form of either type of morality.

In testing the claims of the morality of caring framework, Gilligan and her colleagues typically tap moral reasoning in the context of real life rather than hypothetical situations and employ interpretive data analysis techniques that involve the qualitative assessment of open-ended interview data. Support for the claim of gender differences was uncovered in early research undertaken by Gilligan and her colleagues (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988). However, subsequent studies by a broader range of investigators have tended to find little or no evidence of gender variation (Thomas, 1986; Walker, 1984; Walker, Pitts, Hennig, & Matsuba, 1995).

The universality of the morality of caring framework has been assumed rather than subjected to explicit cross-cultural empirical testing. Although some studies have been conducted by Gilligan and her colleagues with ethnic minority populations within the United States (e.g., Bardige, Ward, Gilligan, Taylor, & Cohen, 1988; Ward, 1988), no known work undertaken in this tradition has tested the assumed cross-cultural universality of this form of morality. The studies conducted with ethnic/minority populations have in some cases called into question claims about the morality of caring being gender-related (Stack, 1986), as well as, most recently, highlighted the links drawn between caring and social justice among African American respondents (Walker & Snarey, 2004). However, there has been no direct challenge to the morality of caring itself. This result reflects the tendency for research to focus only on any references to caring rather than to consider qualitative cultural variation in the nature of caring responses. As will be seen, in tapping caring in ways that are more sensitive to the contrasting cultural meanings underlying caring responses and to contextual variation in care-based reasoning, work in cultural psychology reveals the existence of qualitatively variable forms of the morality of caring.

Summary

Drawing initial inspiration from the seminal theoretical model of Kohlberg, mainstream psychological theories in recent years have increasingly embraced the distinct domain perspective, a viewpoint that retains the focus on the morality of justice but treats justice understandings as coexisting with understandings of social conventions and personal issues. Arguments forward by Gilligan for the existence of a morality of caring are also highly influential in contemporary work, although such a morality generally is no longer considered to be gender related but rather is seen as embraced by both males and females. Differing in their focus, these various mainstream perspectives share a universalistic emphasis that treats culture as incompatible with the requirements of morality.

KEY ASSUMPTIONS OF WORK ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT WITHIN CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

This section presents a brief overview of some of the key theoretical premises of cultural psychology and of the underlying assumptions of work on moral development from a cultural psychology perspective. Consideration of these assumptions makes clear respects in which a cultural focus embodies the constructivism and contextual sensitivity of mainstream psychological models of morality, while giving greater weight to cultural influences on the content of moral codes.

Mutual Constitution of Culture and Psychological Processes

Cultural psychology has at times been characterized as a subfield or area of specialization in psychology, and this type of view may be inad-

vertently implied by the present contrast between the "mainstream" tradition of work on moral development and perspectives within cultural psychology. This terminology, however, is used only to distinguish approaches characterized by different theoretical assumptions about the role of culture in basic psychological theory, and not to distinguish different areas of specialization or fields of study. Work within cultural psychology is defined fundamentally by its conceptual commitments to a view of culture as central in human experience and cuts across all areas of psychology rather than representing a subfield of the discipline.

The core of cultural psychology is the premise that cultural and psychological processes are mutually constitutive (Cole, 1990, 1996; Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996; J. G. Miller, 1997, 1999; Shweder, 1990; Shweder & Sullivan, 1990, 1993). It is not only assumed that culture depends on communities of intentional agents but also that psychological processes require cultural experience for their developmental emergence. With the exception of certain innate propensities that are evident early in infancy, the emergence and maintenance of most psychological processes are seen as dependent on cultural input. Cultural meanings which involve processes of mediation and internalization, are viewed as impacting on individuals' psychological understandings and affecting their cognition and behavior:

> Cultural, institutional, and historical forces are "imported" into individuals' actions by virtue of using cultural tools, on the one hand, and sociocultural settings are created and recreated through individuals' use of mediational means, on the other. The resulting picture is one in which, because of the role cultural tools play in mediated action, it is virtually impossible for us to act in a way that is not socio-culturally situated. (Wertsch, 1995, p. 90)

From this perspective, it is recognized that, although children assume an active role in making sense of their experience, this experience is, in part, culturally patterned. As Bruner (1973) notes, whereas it was recognized during the Cognitive Revolution that individuals go beyond the information given in contributing meanings to experience, the essential role of culture in this meaning-making process was not fully apparent:

> What was obvious from the start was perhaps too obvious to be fully appreciated. . . . The symbolic systems that individuals used in constructing meaning were systems that were already in place, already "there," deeply entrenched in culture and language. . . . When we enter human life, it is as if we walk on stage into a play whose enactment is already in progress—a play whose somewhat open plot determines what parts we may play and toward what denouements we may be heading. (Bruner, 1990, pp. 11, 34)

Within cultural psychology, it is assumed that whereas individuals' understandings of the world and participation in it are mediated by cultural symbols, there is no one-to-one relationship between cultural meanings and individual understandings (J. G. Miller, 1997). In contrast to the claims made by various theorists in the cognitive-developmental and distinct domain traditions (Turiel, 2002), cultural-psychological approaches do not treat the individual in passive terms or assume that there exists a one-to-one mapping between cultural meanings and individual understandings. Rather, cultural psychology embodies an active view of the agent, while also treating this agent as fundamentally socioculturally embedded rather than as a pristine processor of information (Schwartz, 1981).

Dynamic Views of Culture and Psychology

From an ecological perspective, culture is conceptualized in functional terms as adapted to the objective affordances and constraints of different environments (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; Bronfenbrenner, 1979). In an early, highly influential example of this type of model, in the Six Culture Project, cultural practices are treated as functionally related to the objective requirements set by different ecological conditions, with psychological processes seen as mediating between the culture and the physical environment (Whiting & Whiting, 1975). Thus, linkages in this investigation were demonstrated among rich natural ecologies, societies with complex social structures, and child-rearing practices that emphasize competitiveness. Ecological approaches to culture are essential in calling attention to the contrasting adaptive demands of different settings, thus challenging a view that treats the contexts for human development as universal.

Although not downplaying the importance of ecological views of culture, work in cultural psychology emphasizes the need to understand culture also in symbolic terms (Geertz, 1973; Shweder & LeVine, 1984). From such a perspective, culture is seen as a system of symbolic meanings that are embodied in artifacts and practices, and that bear an open rather than fully determinate relationship to objective constraints (Shweder, 1984). Culture is also understood as reflecting, in part, nonfunctional considerations rather than being exclusively functionally based (LeVine, 1984). Such a perspective implies that cultural values and activities cannot be explained exclusively by reference to objective ecological conditions. To give an example, research indicates that Japanese educators tend to consider the preschool practice of having many children assigned to a given teacher as functional in providing children with experience in and promoting their knowledge about being good members of a group (Tobin, Wu, & Davidson, 1989). This symbolic value, however, is less central in U.S. contexts in which preschool educators tend to consider it beneficial to have fewer children assigned to a given teacher, so that the children may be accorded more individual attention and more opportunities to exercise individual decision making. Thus, whereas both types of preschool classroom practices may be considered adaptive, the basis of their functionality cannot be understood merely by reference to objective constraints, such as school resources, but requires also taking into account nonfunctional values, such as pedagogical viewpoints, related to goals for the children's development.

Within cultural psychology, not only is culture seen as affecting the meanings of contexts, and the practices through which contexts are structured, but psychological processes themselves are also recognized as being contextually dependent (J. G. Miller, 1997, 2002). It is assumed that cultural influences on psychological phenomena depend on contextual considerations and should not necessarily be assumed to be highly generalized. Thus, it must be understood, that because a psychological process is in part culturally constituted does not imply that the psychological process, or that any observed cross-cultural variation, is contextually invariant. Rather, the argument is for the need to give weight *both* to culture, as shared meanings and practices, and to context, as objective affordances and constraints, in psychological explanation rather than to reduce one type of consideration to the other.

Conceptions of the Moral

In terms of assumptions related specifically to understanding moral development, theorists in cultural psychology acknowledge commonality and variability in conceptions of both moral and nonrational influences on moral outlooks. These assumptions give rise to a culturally broadened view of diversity rather than to an extreme moral relativism (Miller, 2001).

Formal versus Content-Based Definitions of the Moral

Work in cultural psychology distinguishes between formal and content-based definitions of the moral. Issues of morality are seen as distinguishable from issues of mere social convention by formal criteria such as their perceived generalizability, impersonality, unalterability, and ahistorical qualities (Pool, Shweder, & Much, 1983; Turiel, 1983). Thus, a rule seen in moral as opposed to conventional terms is assumed to apply in all similar social contexts rather than, as in the case of convention, to depend on local customs and norms. Equally, what is moral is considered to be impersonal in the sense that it does not depend on an individual or society recognizing it as such. Whereas issues of morality are seen as nonalterable by social consensus and as historically invariant, issues of social convention are seen as alterable by social consensus and as historically contingent. Areas of behavior that are perceived to be beyond the scope of legitimate social regulation and, thus, considered issues of neither morality nor social convention, are understood as matters of personal choice.

Note that in distinguishing between different types of social understandings on the basis of these formal criteria, researchers in cultural psychology and in the mainstream traditions of work on moral development are rejecting a purely emotivist stance on morality, as might be found in certain behaviorist approaches (Berkowitz, 1964), or a purely conventional stance on morality, as might be found in certain social-psychological work that makes no distinction between morality and mere normative conformity (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Tay-

lor, 2003). Although the influence of affective factors on moral reasoning is not denied (Haidt, 2001; Kagan, 1984), what is moral is considered by the individual to be based on criteria that go beyond mere self-interest or instrumental gain.

However, whereas mainstream and cultural-psychological approaches agree on similar formal definitions of the moral, cultural-psychological approaches treat the relationship between the form and content of morality as potentially culturally variable, whereas it is assumed to be cross-culturally invariant within mainstream approaches (J. G. Miller, 2006; Shweder, 1982). This, then, constitutes the most central point of contrast between the two traditions. Mainstream theories assume that issues of harm, justice, and welfare have the same fundamental meaning and are categorized in the same terms universally. In contrast, work from a cultural psychology suggests that the content invested with moral force extends beyond the issues of harm, rights, and welfare concerns, and that the same types of content issues may be categorized in different terms depending on culturally variable meanings and practices.

Importance of Nonrational Considerations

Reflecting their cognitive-developmental roots, mainstream psychological theories of moral development emphasize the rational nature of moral judgment. Moral reasoning is portrayed as fundamentally similar to other types of cognitive inference, in being based on deductive or inductive processing of information. Thus, if individuals draw different moral inferences based on the same information (e.g., if it is morally acceptable in one cultural population to have an abortion and in another it is not), this difference is likely to arise ultimately from variation in individuals' knowledge about the nature of the harm involved and to be resolvable, at least potentially, by individuals obtaining more scientific facts about the situation (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). From this perspective, moral outlooks are considered to be ultimately reconcilable (i.e., it is assumed that if all individuals had the same information and were able to process this information cognitively in an equally accurate and nonbiased manner, their understandings of the "facts" of situations would be the same, as would their moral judgments (Turiel et al., 1987).

Whereas work within cultural psychology acknowledges both the rational and affectively based inference processes that inform moral judgment, attention is also given to the nonrational judgments that enter into weighting of information and that invariably reflect considerations of value rather than purely reflections of the "facts" of given situations. To give an example, whether abortion is considered a moral violation or a matter of the woman's personal discretion depends in part on culturally and subculturally variable conceptions of which entities in the world are to be considered persons and entitled to protection from harm (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). This delineation of personhood (i.e., the question of when to consider human life as beginning) represents a matter of value that can never be decided based on biological considerations alone. Likewise, in another example, the criteria that underlie the moral appraisal that it is appropriate for parents to read their 10-year-old child's report card without prior permission but not to read their child's diary reflect culturally variable conceptions of what constitute "territories" of the self (e.g., Do they extend to one's mail?) and of what constitutes harm (e.g., Does reading this particular information constitute a violation of the child's privacy or an appropriate expression of concern?). The types of cultural meanings that inform these judgments embody nonrational assumptions that cannot be merely controlled or held constant when evaluating differences in moral outlook. Thus, to attempt to hold them constant when appraising cultural differences in moral outlook, a stance recently advocated by theorists in the distinct domain tradition, would mean adopting a stance that bleaches culture of its meaning (J. G. Miller, 2006).

Although much of the resistance to culture in mainstream approaches to moral development stems from a concern that cultural approaches invariably lead to extreme forms of relativism, this is not the stance adopted within cultural psychology. As noted, the type of position adopted in work on moral development within cultural psychology does not eschew comparative evaluation of cultural practices or equate moral acceptability with the social acceptance of particular practices. Rather, it recognizes that the cultural meanings given to particular practices affect their implications and must therefore be given greater, though still not absolute, weight in evaluating their moral status.

RESEARCH ON CULTURE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Research on culture and moral development centers not merely on assessing the universality of psychological theories of moral development but on expanding the psychological constructs and process explanation invoked in understanding moral outlooks. As will be seen, this work highlights the need to expand present psychological models of morality to recognize qualitative variability in basic moral constructs and outlooks.

Justice Reasoning

Issues of justice have a central role in all psychological theories of morality, with the moral status of justice unchallenged even in theories such as that of Gilligan, which sees the scope of morality as expanded to encompass other types of concerns, such as caring. The central role of justice in any morality is equally not called into question in work in cultural psychology. Rather, on an abstract or formal level, the ideas of both justice and harm are assumed to exist in all moral codes, with the idea of justice seen as the abstract rule of treating like cases alike and the idea of harm as that of avoiding harm (Shweder et al., 1987). However, as cultural theorists have noted, at this abstract level, justice and harm are compatible with a wide range of cultural diversity in moral outlooks, because cultural communities fill in notions of harm and justice in markedly culturally variable ways.

Commonalities

The universality of at least of some moral concern with justice is seen in the mention of justice concerns in moral reasoning early in development, and in at least some commonality in justice reasoning in concrete cases. Thus, cross-cultural commonality tends to be observed in justice judgments in cross-cultural research that utilizes content issues involving "prototypical" cases in which there is considerable cross-cultural agreement about the meaning of the situations portrayed (Turiel, 1983). This can be seen, for example, in control issues included in cross-cultural research that involve issues such as theft or arbitrary assault, which are portrayed as undertaken in a voluntary and intentional way under decontextualized circumstances that include no mention of any alternative motivation or meaning to the behavior. Thus, for example, both Indian and U.S. adult populations have been shown to agree that taking another person's property without their permission represents a moral violation that involves justice violations and includes a violation of property rights (J. G. Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder et al., 1987). Notably, awareness of justice violations is documented in research that utilizes similar prototypical vignettes with young children. Thus, in research involving children as young as 3 years old both in the United States (Smetana, 1981; Smetana, Schlagman, & Adams, 1993) and in different Asian cultures (Song, Smetana, & Kim, 1987; Yau & Smetana, 2003), children identify acts involving arbitrary assault and violation of property rights as justice violations that have moral rather than merely conventional status.

Research of this type supports the idea that justice concerns form part of morality universally. However, it does not indicate that, universally, justice concerns will invariably be accorded the same priority as other types of competing moral issues, that individuals will be held accountable to the same degree cross-culturally for justice breaches, or that the same issues will be conceptualized as involving justice concerns. It is in these areas of instantiating justice judgments in the concrete contexts of everyday moral reasoning that cultural variation in justice morality is shown to exist.

Variation in Priority Given to Justice Relative to Competing Moral Issues

In terms of priority given to justice judgments compared to other types of competing issues, cross-cultural research indicates that even in cases in which there is substantial cross-cultural agreement about the moral status of the justice issue involved, cross-cultural variation may result from differential priority being given to justice issues compared to other salient, competing moral concerns. Such a tendency may be seen, for example, in the following qualitative response given by a respondent to a Kohlbergian hypothetical dilemma that involved the issue of whether a son should let his father spend money for his own personal uses that the son had earned, and that the father had promised to let the son use to pay for attending camp. A Kenyan respondent is responsive to

the justice issue embodied in the vignette (i.e., the breach of a promise by the father) but gives priority to the son's duty to be responsive to his father's wishes and authority:

> [If a father breaks his word], it will cause hatred because the son will be angry, saying, "I wanted to follow my own intentions, but my father cheated: he permitted me and then refused me." . . . So it is bad. . . . [However,] the one for the son is worse. Imagine a child disobeying my own words, is he really normal? (Edwards, 1986, p. 425)

The Kohlbergian scoring protocol, it may be noted, was not sensitive to this type of differential weighting of justice and competing moral concerns, and would have scored this as a nonmoral conventional stance. This type of stance, failing to appreciate the moral character of conflicting concerns, may have contributed to the skewed distribution of moral reasoning observed cross-culturally (Snarey, 1985).

Other evidence that there may be relatively greater priority given to interpersonal considerations compared to competing justice concerns in collectivist cultures is supported by experimentally controlled research that presented samples of U.S. and Indian adult and child populations with hypothetical conflict situations in which fulfillment of a justice issue conflicts with fulfillment of a competing interpersonal responsibility (J. G. Miller & Bersoff, 1992). An idiographic procedure was utilized in constructing the conflict situations to ensure that individuals viewed the individual justice and interpersonal breaches as equivalent in their seriousness and as tapping a range of issues, from major life-threatening concerns to minor issues. There was a common trend to give priority to the justice issues in the case of the life-threatening breaches (i.e., that pitted taking a life against saving a life). However, in a pattern congruent with the cross-cultural Kohlbergian trends reported earlier, marked cross-cultural differences were observed in the case of the non-life-threatening breaches. Thus, the Indian respondents tended more frequently to give priority to the competing interpersonal obligations than did the U.S. respondents. For example, whereas all of the U.S. respondents judged that it was morally wrong to steal a train ticket, even if this was the only way to fulfill the interpersonal responsibility of attending a best friend's wedding, a majority of the Indian respondents judged that it was morally required to participate as planned in the wedding, even if this meant having to engage in the justice breach of stealing the ticket.

While supporting the universality of a moral concern with issues of justice, this research challenges claims that justice issues invariably take priority over competing moral concerns, an assumption that has been made in past theorizing based on the Kantian notion of perfect versus imperfect duties (Gert, 1988; Kant, 1797/1964; Urmson, 1958). From this latter perspective, justice is considered a "perfect" duty that may be fully realizable, in that it involves prohibition-oriented concerns (i.e., not to violate another's rights or to harm another). In contrast, helping and issues of family and friendship obligations are considered "imperfect" or "superogatory" concerns. The latter are considered desirable to undertake, but because of their positive orientation (i.e., calling for positive responsiveness to someone else's needs), they are too unbounded in scope to be fully realizable and must therefore always be somewhat delimited in scope. The present evidence highlights the need to recognize that whereas this type of formal distinction may be drawn between negative versus positive duties, the cultural meaning given to these two types of issues is crucial in how they are weighted in moral judgment, and not merely their status as positive versus negative obligations (J. G. Miller, 1991).

Variation in Weighting of Contextual Factors

Cross-cultural research on social attribution has documented marked cross-cultural differences in social inference. Thus, it has been demonstrated that there tends to be a greater emphasis on explaining social behavior in terms of dispositional traits of the person in individualistic cultures, whereas in collectivist cultures more weight is given in social attribution to social role relations and other contextual factors (Cousins, 1989; J. G. Miller, 1984; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). In terms of moral reasoning, these cross-cultural differences related to folk theories of the agent's relationship to the surround translate into variation in judgments of moral accountability or responsibility.

Judgments of accountability are presupposed in moral reasoning, in that they bear on the intentional nature of behavior. The domain of rule-governed behavior involves voluntary

action in which the agent is judged to have sufficient control over his or her behavior to be held accountable for performing it. From this perspective, an agent cannot be held accountable for a behavior that is a mere occurrence or involuntary event; only if it is judged that an agent could have acted otherwise or prevented a particular behavior can he or she be held accountable for having engaged in this behavior. Thus, as research has shown, persons tend to be judged less responsible for a given behavior to the extent that the behavior is understood to be unintended, the agent is seen as lacking the capacities to understand the consequences of his or her behavior or to control its execution, or the behavior is seen as under the control of situational influences (Darley & Zanna, 1982; Fincham & Jaspars, 1980; Heider, 1958).

Research evidence suggests that in tending to view behavior as more situationaly influenced than U.S. populations, Indians tend more frequently to treat contextual factors as extenuating circumstances that reduce agents' accountability for justice violations (Bersoff & Miller, 1993). Thus, it has been shown that Indian adult and child populations more frequently absolve agents of accountability for what they perceive to be harmful or unjust behavior to the extent that this behavior is undertaken either under emotional duress or in the context of agent immaturity. For example, whereas both Indian and U.S. respondents agree that breaking into a locked house constitutes a moral violation, Indians more frequently than Americans maintain that agents should not be held morally accountable for such a breach if the agent had been frightened by an unexpected noise.

Variation in Definitions of Harm and Injustice

Perhaps most fundamentally, cultural variation in justice reasoning reflects the contrasting cultural theories of the person, of social relations, and of their interrelationship that affect how harm and justice are defined in concrete cases. Notably this variation is not just a matter of individuals having different available information but of contrasting definitions of personhood and harm that cannot be merely adjudicated by reference to the "facts" of situations.

Within Hindu Indian culture the persons seen as entitled to protection from harm extends to all forms of life (Vasudev & Hummel, 1987). Rather than a matter of mere personal choice, refraining from eating or otherwise harming animals is considered a moral and not merely a personal issue. Likewise, in other cases, the domains of the self that are seen as entitled to protection from harm may be drawn more broadly in collectivist than in individualistic cultures, resulting in acts that have a moral status in individualistic cultures not seen as entailing issue of harms or rights violations in collectivist cultures. Thus, for example, with respect to issues of family inheritance, in assuming that females should be accorded equal status as males, U.S. adults consider an inheritance practice that disadvantages the female to be a violation of her rights (Shweder et al., 1987). In contrast, in treating male–female relations in more differentiated terms, Indian adults consider it appropriate and thus not a moral violation for females to have lesser inheritance than males. It may be further noted that within cultures of honor, such as found in certain communities within the U.S. South, conceptions of personhood are so intertwined with social reputation that harm to reputation tends to be perceived as inseparable from harm to the self (Cohen & Nisbett, 1997; Vandello & Cohen, 2003).

Interpersonal Morality

Interpersonal morality pertains to responsibilities that exist to meet the needs of others and is therefore a type of "positive" morality that contrasts with the "negative" or prohibition-oriented morality of justice. Whereas justice morality involves refraining from acts of harm or injustice, interpersonal morality involves showing positive responsiveness to the needs of others. Interpersonal responsiveness has always been considered an aspect of morality, because it concerns issues of welfare; however, at least within the Kantian tradition that informs the work of theorists such as Kohlberg and Turiel, it has been assumed to have a superordinate or discretionary status rather than the fully obligatory character of justice morality (Kahn, 1992).

As noted earlier, in forwarding her model of a morality of caring, Gilligan (1982) challenged these Kantian assumptions and argued for the need to recognize caring as a qualitative, distinct form of morality that differs from that of justice but is fully moral in character. Thus, she maintained that the morality of car-

ing is not subordinate to that of justice. She also argued that the morality of caring is based on a type of affective commitment or "co-feeling" that is oriented toward welfare concerns and is not vulnerable to self-serving and non-welfare-oriented emotions.

I mention the contributions of cultural research to demonstrate that moralities of caring take distinctive forms, and that the form of the morality of caring identified by Gilligan and her colleagues represents a culturally distinctive perspective grounded in the individualism of U.S. culture. Strikingly, this work also provides direct insight into the nature of caring responses among U.S. populations, suggesting that morality of caring responses are more contingent than assumed.

To assess the perceived moral status of caring, research conducted among U.S. and Indian adult and child populations tapped perceived responsibilities to meet the needs of others in cases involving low sacrifice or cost to the helper, and varying role relationships and levels of need (Miller et al., 1990; see also J. G. Miller & Luthar, 1989; J. G. Miller & Bersoff, 1994, 1995). In both cultures, helping tended to be seen as highly desirable and as a perceived responsibility. Among the U.S. respondents, the dominant tendency was to treat helping as a matter for personal decision making, whereas among Indian respondents, helping tended to be seen as an issue that is legitimately subject to social regulation. The trends observed among the U.S. respondents call attention to respects in which the approach to caring adopted in Gilligan's model embodies a voluntaristic approach to interpersonal responsibilities that is consonant, at least in this respect, with the aretaic model of helping assumed in the Kantian tradition, and that is in accord with the emphasis on personal freedom of choice in U.S. culture. In contrast, they point to the existence in India of a tendency to accord interpersonal responsibilities a more obligatory moral status, one that accords it the same status as issues of justice, a pattern predicted by neither the aretaic model of the Kantian framework nor Gilligan's portrayal of the morality of caring.

Gilligan herself emphasized the freely given nature of interpersonal responsiveness in the morality of caring, viewing caring responses as based not on role obligations but on affectively grounded personal commitments, providing a reliable basis for moral commitments that is not affected by nonmoral emotions. A cross-cultural study conducted among U.S. and Indian adults, utilized a between-participant manipulation to assess the impact of personal affinity and liking on perceived interpersonal responsibilities (J. G. Miller & Bersoff, 1998). Both U.S. and Indian respondents judged that moral responsibilities of parents to their young children were unaffected by such nonmoral affective considerations (i.e., the responsibility to meet a need of one's child is unaffected by how much personal affinity and liking one has for the child). However, in the case of adult siblings, friends, and even adult troop leaders to their child Scouts, U.S. adults judged that the responsibility to help was less when the relationship involved low personal affinity and liking compared with high personal affinity and liking. Thus, for example, U.S. respondents judged that a man had less moral responsibility to help his brother move into a new apartment if the man and his brother shared few common tastes and interests, and were not affectively close, compared with a situation in which they shared many tastes and interests, and had a warm and affectionate relationship. In contrast, the moral responsibility to help was not found to be contingent on such nonmoral considerations among the Indian respondents. These results suggest that the morality of caring as it exists among middle-class European American respondents is more contingent on nonmoral affective considerations than previously assumed, and, in this respect, somewhat vulnerable to the unreliability assumed by Kantian theorists to inhere in any affectively based morality. In contrast, the results suggest that the type of role-based perspective emphasized among middle-class Hindu Indian respondents is less contingent on nonmoral affective preferences.

Research conducted among U.S. populations of different religious backgrounds extends this work by suggesting that the pattern observed among U.S. respondents may reflect, at least in part, the value placed within Christianity on acting in accord with one's mental states (Cohen & Rozin, 2001). It was documented that, compared to Jewish respondents, Christian respondents make a more negative appraisal of the moral character of a hypothetical agent who behaves in ways that are responsive to the needs of his elderly parents whom he dislikes. These findings, which were demonstrated in other types of moral appraisal as well, not only

point to possible within-culture sources of variation in interpersonal morality but also identify some of the specific ways that Christian doctrine may have impact on the results observed in the cross-cultural investigation by J. G. Miller and Bersoff (1998), a study undertaken among a predominately Christian U.S. population.

More generally, the consistent pattern of cross-cultural differences observed in these various studies highlights the need to broaden the theoretical framework of Gilligan to take into account the observed cross-cultural variation. The responses observed among the U.S. and the Indian respondents both represent moralities of caring and encompass what theorists have characterized as types of *Gemeinschaft* concerns (Snarey & Keljo, 1991). However, whereas the approach captured in Gilligan's theoretical model privileges a voluntaristic approach to caring of an agent acting outside of role obligations, the approach captured in the work described earlier in India privileges an agent attuned to what are perceived to be natural duties associated with his or her social roles. This insight led to the proposal for expanding the theoretical constructs invoked to understand interpersonal morality, with the type of approach captured in Gilligan's model termed an "individually oriented" perspective and that observed in India termed a more "duty-based" perspective (J. G. Miller, 1994). Notably, the point of these conceptual labels is to call for an expansion of theory in this area and not to make assertions about uniform differences in moral orientation (J. G. Miller, 2006). In arguing that the morality of caring can take a "duty-based" form, no claim is being made that Indians always emphasis duty in moral reasoning, just as when Gilligan argued for the existence of a "morality of caring," she was not claiming that women in all cases emphasize caring in moral reasoning.

Although the available research to date is limited, evidence suggests that modes of caring found in other collectivist cultures differ in distinctive ways from both the morality of caring framework identified among U.S. respondents and that observed in the Indian research discussed earlier. To give some examples, work has uncovered among Japanese populations an emphasis on an approach to interpersonal morality that centers on issues on *omoiyari*, or empathy within one's ingroup (Shimizu, 2001). For example, such a stance is reflected in the following response of an adolescent boy who does not report a case of vandalism by another student to the teachers; the boy takes such action in empathizing with the student's desire to retain a supportive relationship with his mother, the school nurse—a relationship that would be disrupted by such a report:

> You see if I became their enemy (by accusing them), they would feel uncomfortable to see my mother. . . . So although they destroy school property, I would feel bad for them if they lost someone with whom they could talk about their problems. (Shimizu, 2001, p. 463)

In turn, work with Chinese populations illustrates an approach to interpersonal morality that privileges what is perceived to be the innate, affectively grounded moral tendency of *jen*, "the deep affection for kin rooted in filial piety and extended through the family circle to all men" (Dien, 1982, p. 334). This can be seen, for example, in the invocation of the concept of *jen* by a Chinese respondent in reasoning about the Heinz dilemma:

> Even though the law did not set limit to the price of the drug, the druggist should not set the price so high because the druggist should have the feeling of distress at the suffering of others. He knows pretty well that the drug is used to cure people in danger, and if the price is so high, the poor people couldn't afford to buy it and would therefore lose their lives. So, the price should not be set so high based on *jen*. In addition, in making the drug, the druggist should hold a "doctor-with-a-parental-heart" attitude. Otherwise, the social consequences are likely to be disastrous. (Ma, 1997, p. 107)

Although this type of response would be scored at the conventional level in the Kohlbergian approach, as critics have pointed out and as argued here, it represents a type of alternative, communitarian postconventional morality.

Moralities of Divinity

Treating morality as secular in nature, the dominant psychological theories of morality assume that religious concerns have no role in morality. Within the mainstream frameworks, religion is excluded from morality, because it is seen as based on faith rather than on rationality. Although it is empirically observed that spiritual concerns are mentioned in open-ended reasoning, such concerns are considered to be

merely conventional rather than moral in nature. Cultural research demonstrates, in contrast, that spiritual concerns are integrally related to concerns with justice and caring, and are therefore the core to lay conceptions of morality.

Evidence for this claim may be seen, for example, in research on moral exemplars. Thus, in an indepth qualitative study of the perspectives of individuals who identified as having shown extraordinary moral commitment, Colby and Damon (1992) observed that many of these individuals attributed their value commitments to their religious faith. Such a stance is illustrated in the following explanation given by a respondent who ascribes the years she devoted to caring for the poor to her conversion to fundamentalist Christianity: "I didn't know how I was doing it or why, but I know the Holy Spirit was leading me, saying, 'You have to help them, you have to help them' " (p. 354). As reflected in this response, many individuals attributed their stamina in being able to make the type of personal sacrifice entailed in living morally exemplary lives to their faith and saw serving God as part of the justification for their actions. Similar results have been observed in the case of populations who maintain a predominately secular outlook. Thus, for example, Walker et al. (1995) found that concerns with religion, faith, and spirituality commonly informed the lay conceptions of morality held by adolescents and adults from the Vancouver area of Canada, a region that is highly secular. In this investigation, religion was observed to provide justifications for a morality built on ideas of justice and welfare, including concerns that focused on issues of reward and punishment, such as fear of eternal damnation; concerns that appeared to include some conventional elements, such as the importance of church and fellow believers; and concerns that involved moral principles such as *agape* love.

Spiritual outlooks have been shown to motivate not only commitments to moralities based on justice or caring but also to entail distinctive epistemological assumptions that impact on how issues of justice and caring are understood at different ages. Such trends were documented, for example, in a study examining the responses of Nepalese Buddhist monks to the Kohlbergian Heinz moral dilemma (Huebner & Garrod, 1991, 1993). Reflecting outlooks framed by Buddhist conceptions of karma, at younger ages, respondents centered on the negative karma that would ensue from Heinz stealing the drug. As a young adolescent argued, "If you create negative actions (bad karma), then you will become sick or die and when you die, then you will go to the animal realism or to the hell realms . . . or you will be born into very bad future lives with much sickness and no money" (1993, p. 180). In contrast, at older ages, karma entered into moral judgments in affecting the reasons why life is to be valued. Thus, in assuming that all beings continue to exist in some form endlessly, an older adolescent justified saving Heinz's wife's life out of concern for her contributions to society:

> If the person dies, then that person will no longer be around. He will go on to another existence, but maybe he will be an animal or in another part of the world. Anyway, he will never be exactly the same again. This is the way it is, and so we must protect people from dying. If it is for two more years, or even as short as three months, this person can still do some good things. He can help another person. (Huebner & Garrod, 1991, p. 181)

In these responses, the central concept is not one of a perceived right to life, as observed typically among respondents from a Judeo-Christian background, but rather the unique qualities distinguishing different lives.

Importantly, cultural evidence also demonstrates that spiritual outlooks not only support moralities of justice and of caring but also constitute their own distinctive form of morality. Thus, Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park (1997) established that there exist three and not merely two, broad forms of moral orientation: (1) an ethics of "autonomy" that involves issues of harm, rights, and justice, and that has been the center of both Kohlbergian research and that in the distinct domain tradition; (2) an ethics of "community" that involves responsiveness to the needs of others, and that has been the focus both in Gilligan's morality of caring model and in more cultural approaches to caring; and (3) an ethics of "divinity" that has tended to be considered exclusively a conventional type of orientation. The morality of divinity involves concerns with issues such as the sacred order, sin, purity, pollution, and sanctity that bear on protection of the human soul from spiritual degradation and on promotion of spiritual refinement. Evidence for the

existence of this ethic may be seen in themes that were spontaneously mentioned in reasoning about everyday behavioral events among an orthodox Hindu Indian sample and a secular U.S. sample (Shweder et al., 1997). In certain cases, concerns with divinity were common across the two cultural populations, with both U.S. and Indian respondents raising concerns primarily involving divinity in the case of the issue of incest. In other cases, the concerns tended to be culturally variable, with, for example, the secular U.S. population tending to consider eating beef as involving the absence of harm and the orthodox Hindu Indian population centering on the spiritual degradation that would ensue from such behavior. The morality of divinity has also been shown to be distinguishable from the moralities of autonomy and of community in terms of its emotional meanings. Thus, research conducted among U.S. and Japanese college students demonstrates that disgust is associated with violations of purity–sanctity, a central concern in the morality of divinity, whereas anger is linked to the individual rights' violations associated with the morality of autonomy, and contempt is linked to the violation of communal codes in the morality of community (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999).

Work on themes of divinity also highlights the need to understand morality as extending beyond issues involving harm or welfare and demonstrates that perceptions of harm or welfare are culturally variable. In this regard, research conducted among a U.S. and a Brazilian population of lower socioeconomic status demonstrates that issues perceived to involve extremely disgusting or disrespectful actions, such as using the national flag for a bathroom rag or eating the family dog, are perceived as moral violations, even though such actions are regarded as principally involving concerns related to divinity and not harm (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). Thus, within the Brazilian population, moral judgment was more closely predicted by asking whether the respondent was "bothered" personally by the action than by asking whether anyone was harmed. Work by Jensen (1997, 1998) has further documented that whether or not harm is even seen as existing in a given situation depends on spiritual outlooks. This trend is illustrated in work comparing moral judgments of the orthodox Hindu Indian practice of *sati*. Whereas orthodox U.S. respondents treated such behavior as an issue of moral harm, many of the orthodox Indians viewed it as virtuous behavior. As one orthodox Hindu informant commented:

> *Sati* is morally right. . . . The wife dies with her husband in order to (preserve) her chasitity and (show) her devotion to her husband. (Jensen, 1998, p. 101)

Work of this type notably highlights the need to recognize that whether or not harm is even perceived to exist depends in part on culturally and religiously based value commitments.

Summary

Cultural work demonstrates that marked cross-cultural variation exists in justice reasoning that reflects contrasting weighting of competing moral and nonmoral concerns, and culturally variable assumptions concerning the nature of persons, harm, and territories of the self entitled to protection from harm. This work also documents that forms of interpersonal morality are culturally variable; indeed, the framework proposed by Gilligan is itself a culturally bound model. Culturally variable forms of interpersonal morality differ in important respects, among others, such as their emphasis on personal choice, contingency on nonmoral considerations, and weight accorded to affective considerations. Importantly, cultural work is also highlighting the need to expand the scope of the moral domain to encompass concerns involving divinity. Such concerns constitute a distinctive form of morality that embraces conceptions of spiritual concerns that transcend issues of harm.

NEW DIRECTIONS

In terms of promising new directions, cultural work on moral development is further examining the nature of moral reasoning in everyday contexts, exploring issues of power dynamics and culture conflict, and contributing to an understanding of the developmental processes through which moral outlooks emerge. Select examples of this work are briefly discussed below as I highlight some of the new theoretical insights and methodological approaches that distinguish work in this area.

Morality in Everyday Contexts

In examining moral development in relation to a wider range of everyday situations, cultural work is contributing to further conceptual broadening of the scope of the moral domain. One example of this type of approach is found in a recent series of studies that examined reasoning about real-life ecological issues, such as the 1990 Exxon *Valdez* oil spill, among children of different sociocultural backgrounds and different everyday relationships to the natural environment (Howe & Kahn, 1996; Kahn, 1997, 1998, 1999). Age-related changes were observed among U.S. children, with second graders tending to emphasize a "homocentric" form of reasoning that focuses on implications of harm to the ecology relative to human welfare (e.g., that polluting nature would get people sick), and fifth-grade and eighth-grade students placing greater emphasis on "biocentric" reasoning that treats nature itself as having moral standing or an intrinsic right to be protected from harm. In contrast, homocentric forms of reasoning tend to be emphasized among children from the Brazilian Amazon. Providing evidence to suggest that universally moral and not merely conventional reasoning is applied to protecting the natural world from harm, this work also highlights the varied sociocultural processes that impact on children's outlooks. Thus, whereas the perspective of the U.S. sample appears to reflect in part the emphasis placed on ecological concerns in the curriculum of U.S. schools and popular culture, the outlooks of children from the Brazilian Amazon appear to stem, at least in part, from individuals' sense of being more dependent on nature for their immediate physical survival.

In another example of approaches to understanding morality in everyday contexts, an ethnographic study examined the processes by which youth organizations create moral experiences that are instrumental in participant's adaptation in the larger community (Heath, 1996). Norms that develop in such organizations promote moral values, such as a sense of fair processes, as well as family-like relationships of caring. Such outlooks are reflected, for example, in the everyday conversations among members of an all-male, African American inner-city basketball team in reflecting on how they saw their coach as getting them to do what was considered right. Work of this type points to the value of understanding moral values as they emerge in everyday behavioral interaction and conversational interchange, rather than conducting studies focused explicitly on moral reasoning tasks.

Power Dynamics and Culture Conflict

In terms of new directions, cultural work also focuses on integrating a concern with cultural meanings and practices, and a concern with power dynamics. It is recognized that cultural meanings and practices may in some cases constitute instruments of domination, in which groups in subordinate positions suffer discrimination and have unequal access to resources (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 1993; Appadurai, 1988; Turiel, 1998b, 2002). However, cultural also emphasizes work that relationships of unequal power need to be understood in the context of culturally variable meanings and practices.

In the area of dissent, research demonstrates that cultural practices are framed in ways that take into account distinctive cultural emphases; thus, they do not in all cases privilege what is assumed in mainstream psychological theories of morality to be the universal moral value of individual equality. This type of trend was observed, for example, in a comparative study examining conceptions of everyday family roles and of feminism among samples of middle-aged women from Japan and the U.S. (Schaberg, 2002). Although the Japanese women expressed dissent with the gender role practices of their society, their concerns did not map directly onto the concerns with seeking greater freedom of choice and equality expressed by U.S. respondents. Valuing reciprocal interdependence in family relationships, the Japanese women criticized the family role expectations of their society as insufficiently flexible and called for greater accommodation in gender role expectations. However, they rejected the egalitarian model of marital relations emphasized by U.S. respondents. The Japanese respondents also forwarded a moral critique of what they viewed as the individual-centered and, in their eyes, somewhat selfish stance of U.S. feminism, and called for a form of feminism that, differing from that emphasized within the United States, entailed a greater commitment to social activism and contributing to the community.

In another example, an ethnographically based sociolinguistic study of Hindu Indian family life likewise documented respects in

which dissent tends to be framed in culturally distinctive ways that may give priority to social hierarchy rather than treat all persons as morally equal (Much, 1997). Such a trend may be illustrated in the example of an adolescent son in a Brahmin family who temporarily stopped wearing the holy symbol of the Sacred Thread. The son's reported motives were to challenge the moral meanings given to that symbol and to express his own personal view that wearing such a symbol represented merely an unimportant matter of social convention rather than a moral duty. However, in framing dissent in this way, the son notably did not call into question more fundamental commitments of his cultural community to the principle of hierarchy and to the importance of caste identity.

These same types of concerns with attending both to power dynamics and culturally variable meanings is also evident in work examining culture conflict in the context of immigration (Shweder, Minow, & Markus, 2002). This work, like that preceding it, focuses on the challenge of identifying standards for moral appraisal that, while being sensitive to issues of harm and abuse, recognize that their identification must proceed in culturally sensitive ways. In this regard, as Shweder, Markus, Minow, and Kessel (1997) have pointed out, problems arise when the legal system and other public institutions enforcing particular U.S. outlooks on values such as equality, child rights, and so on, end up overriding the contrasting outlooks and everyday practices of immigrant populations. In examining this type of issue, Shweder (2002) critically examined the meanings associated with a practice, such as female genital alteration, that, while treated as a universal issue of harm by various feminist scholars and governmental institutions, is invested with cultural meanings and embodied in everyday cultural practices that give it value as a sign of female identity and maturity. In other examples, Kim and Markus (2002) critically examine the cultural emphasis on verbal expression in particular U.S. mainstream cultural contexts, which gives rise to cultural practices that may infringe on what may be seen as a "freedom of silence" in immigrant groups that place a greater value on nonverbal modes of communication.

Notably, work in this general area of power dynamics and culture conflict is of value in addressing not only this central theoretical challenge of how to integrate a concern with cultural meanings and power dynamics in moral appraisal of cultural practices but also the question of moral relativism that has been central in psychological work on moral development. It argues for the need to recognize the complex, yet necessary, questions that arise in moral appraisal of cultural practices. Embodying what might be characterized as a pragmatic rather than extreme form of moral relativism, this type of cultural psychology stance does not eschew comparative cultural appraisal but maintains that such appraisal must proceed with as complete as possible an understanding of local cultural viewpoints, including that of the observer. As Shweder comments:

> Cultural psychology fully acknowledges that there is no way to avoid making critical judgments about good and bad, right and wrong, true and false, efficient and inefficient. . . . Any culture deserving of respect, must be defensible in the face of criticism from "outside." . . . One of the distinctive features of cultural psychology is that it is willing to try to make that defense, representing the "inside" point of view in such a way that it can be understood, perhaps appreciated, or at the very least tolerated from an "outside" point of view. (2000a, p. 216)

The resultant stance calls for a more pluralistic view of cultural diversity than that embodied in the mainstream perspectives on moral development in psychology, or in many contemporary public institutions. It acknowledges the existence at an abstract moral level of moral universals, including concerns with "justice, beneficence, autonomy, sacrifice, liberty, loyalty, sanctity, duty" (Shweder, 2000b, p. 164), while also recognizing that these goods are instantiated in culturally distinctive ways and cannot be maximized simultaneously.

Enculturation and Moral Development

Finally, another important new direction for work on moral development is to contribute to an understanding of the processes through which moral meanings are embodied and communicated in everyday practices. This work increasingly not only focuses on discourse practices as contexts for child socialization but also attends to language use and normative shifts that impact on the changing moral outlooks of adults.

Work with child populations is calling attention to the role of discourse practices as contexts in which children come to understand, as

well as to participate in creating, shared moral outlooks that are salient within their cultural communities. In early groundbreaking work in this area, Much and Shweder (1978) documented that children tacitly display, as well as come to develop, their ability to distinguish between different types of rules as a function of how they and others in their social environments respond to their behavior. Thus, kindergartners and their teachers offered distinctive types of justifications to breaches of different types of social rules. Both children and teachers tended to respond to breaches of social conventions with statements concerning the applicability of the relevant rule. For example, a child defended his violation of the rule that children were to play outside by citing his cold as a plausible exception to the rule—"My mother said! I just got a sore throat!"—only to be rebuffed by a teacher who offered an alternative interpretation of the prevailing rule—"Well, if you can't go out, then you stay home because you're sick" (Much & Shweder, 1978, p. 21). In contrast, children responded to breaches of moral rules, a type of rule that is considered absolute, in ways that either denied that the act occurred or that redefined the act to make the agent nonblameworthy. Thus, for example, a child accused of stealing a peer's chair responded that because the chair was empty, she did not steal it, she merely "sat in it" (p. 37). Notably, this type of conversational interchange, with its opportunities for feedback and negotiation, functioned in a tacit way that conveyed powerful culturally variable moral messages, even though it was not viewed by any of the participants as involving issues of morality.

Cultural work is also focusing on how everyday socialization practices in the family and larger community embody particular moral values. Thus, for example, recent sociolinguistic work among families from Taiwan has documented an emphasis on disciplinary practices that communicate a moral sense of shame (Fung, 1999; Fung & Chen, 2001). This may be seen in the following example of a mother and older sister's verbal shaming responses to a 3-year-old child who has committed the breach of approaching the researcher's camcorder. The mother threatens to ostracize and withdraw love from her child, commenting, "We don't want you; you stand here. Mama is mad. Look how ugly your crying will be on tape"—a stance underscored by the 5-year-old sister joining in with the chant, "Ugly monster, ugly monster" (Fung, 1999, p. 193). This type of moral emphasis notably is also evident in other everyday socialization practices, with Taiwanese mothers using personal storytelling as an opportunity to communicate moral lessons through spontaneously narrating examples of children's past transgressions, a trend not observed among European American mothers, who tend more frequently to use such interaction as an opportunity for entertainment and affirmation of the child's sense of self and promotion of their self-esteem (P. J. Miller, Wiley, Fung, & Liang, 1997). More generally, cultural work is pointing to the role of culture in assigning children to different everyday socialization contexts that affect their moral outlooks. Thus, for example, Edwards (1985) has pointed to the role of everyday experiences in sibling caregiving in various African rural communities as opportunities for the socialization of responsibility, whereas cross-national comparisons have pointed to the role of voluntary work commitments for adolescents in promoting a sense of civic responsibility (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, & Shblanova, 1998).

Notably, work by Rozin (1999) on "moralization" examines processes by which affective preferences are converted into moral commitments among adult and not merely child members of a culture. Thus, Rozin traces how common cultural practices, such as cigarette smoking or even overeating, that may be associated with negative affective reactions such as disgust, can take on moral overtones for individuals through not only rational reflection but also a range of societal practices that call negative attention to such behavior, such as a cigarette tax, initiating scientific inquiry to uncover new information about processes that affect the behavior and the implementation of new legal regulations. Such processes of cultural change in the perceived moral status of particular behaviors can occur relatively rapidly, with the moralization of attitudes toward smoking occurring across three generations of Americans within a 20- to 40-year period, and morally coloring people's perceptions (Rozin & Singh, 1999). Thus, in a striking illustration of such an effect, U.S. college students tend to judge people who eat primarily high-fat diets to be less considerate than people who eat primarily fruits and vegetables (Stein & Nemeroff, 1995).

Summary

In terms of new directions, research on moral development is increasingly examining moral outlooks reflected in a wide range of real-life issues and everyday cultural settings. Integrating a concern with power dynamics with an attention to cultural meanings and practices, this work provides insight into processes of resistance and dissent, as well as issues of cultural conflict. New process accounts that are also being developed not only highlight the everyday practices and modes of social interaction that impact on children's developing moral outlooks but also provide insights into the affectively and culturally grounded processes by which moral outlooks change at a societal level that affects the outlooks of adults.

CONCLUSION

Research on moral development in cultural psychology highlights the need to expand contemporary mainstream psychological theories of morality, to make them more culturally inclusive, and to pay increased attention to the role of cultural meanings and everyday practices in the developmental emergence of moral outlooks. Rather than leading to an extreme form of moral relativism, work in this tradition underscores the importance of becoming more aware of the discretionary aspects of one's own cultural outlooks and of appraising alternative cultural commitments in ways that are appreciative of their coherence and sense. Generative in nature and increasingly addressing real-world applications, work on moral development in cultural psychology underscores the inseparable interrelationships between culture, morality, and lived experience.

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