Review Article

The Moral Emotions of Guilt and Satisfaction: A Cross-Cultural Perspective

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Major psychological theories of morality and motivation make the assumption that an inverse relationship exists between guilt and satisfaction. To the extent that feelings of guilt are linked to a particular motivational or moral stance, it is assumed that feelings of satisfaction are unlikely also to be linked to that stance. Empirical findings in the areas of motivation and morality indicate that in collectivist cultural settings that assume less opposition as existing between the individual and the social order, these emotions do not tend to be viewed as opposed in regard to prosocial behavior. Rather, there is a greater tendency for individuals to associate duty and guilt with satisfaction in the context of being responsive to the needs of family and friends. Attention is also given to how these contrasting motivational and moral outlooks develop and influence outlooks on dissent, with conclusions drawn for ways to conduct more culturally sensitive research.

Keywords: Morality, motivation, culture, dissent, socialization

Satisfaction and guilt are morally relevant emotions. In terms of morality, guilt is associated with the violation of behavior that is socially and /or morally required, while satisfaction is most commonly associated with behavior that goes beyond the perceived requirements of duty. Feelings of guilt motivate reparative behavior, such as confessions, apologies or attempts at redress, or lead individuals to refrain from engaging in transgressions in the first place (Tangney, 2002). In contrast, feelings of satisfaction are experienced as self affirming and motivate continued engagement in the activity.

Questions arise, however, concerning the relationship between satisfaction and guilt as moral emotions. Within most psychological theories of morality and of social development, this relationship is assumed to be the inverse. One is assumed to experience guilt when acting with an eye to social expectations but to experience satisfaction when acting in a freely given way. To the extent that feelings of guilt are linked to a particular activity, it is assumed that feelings of satisfaction are unlikely also to be linked to this activity. Recent cultural work, however, suggests that the relationship between satisfaction and guilt may be culturally variable (e.g., Janoff-Bulman & Leggatt, 2002).

The paper is organized into two main parts. In the first section, discussion focuses on major psychological theories of morality and motivation. It is argued that these theories share the view that the optimum form of functioning occurs when feelings
of guilt that are linked to social expectations have been transcended, as it is assumed to be only then that individuals are able to experience satisfaction in their actions. In the second section, evidence is presented to suggest that in cultural contexts that assume less opposition as existing between the individual and the social order, these emotions do not tend to be viewed as opposed. Finally, in conclusion, theoretical and methodological implications are drawn for conducting more culturally sensitive research bearing on duty, satisfaction, and guilt.

Relationship of Guilt to Satisfaction in Dominant Theoretical Models

An analytic framework that equates “self/individual” with such things as spontaneity, genuine feeling, privacy, uniqueness, constancy, the “inner life” and then opposes these to mask, role, rule or context is a reflection of dichotomies that constitute the modern Western self (Rosaldo, 1984, p. 146).

Psychological theories tend to assume that a certain tension or conflict exists between the goals of the self and the requirements of the social group. From this perspective, the optimum form of functioning is seen as occurring when an individual is acting in a way that is autonomously chosen rather than influenced by social expectations. As illustrated below in the areas of moral development and motivation, this type of assumption leads to theories in which it is assumed that guilt and satisfaction are inversely related, with greater guilt associated with a lesser sense of satisfaction.

Moral Development

A common assumption maintained within psychological theories of moral development is that higher order moral reasoning involves behavior that is self directed rather than undertaken in response to normative expectations, with the former type of behavior linked to satisfaction and the latter type linked to guilt. Such a stance is reflected in models of moral development and is evident in interpretations made of cross-cultural variation in moral outlooks.

Psychoanalytic Theory. Psychoanalytic theory provides one of the earliest and most extensive accounts of the role of guilt in normative behavior (Freud, 1938). In psychoanalytic theory, an opposition is assumed to exist between the self and the social order, with the affective response of guilt seen as crucial in mediating this difference and in promoting socially expected behavior. The ego is seen as torn, on the one hand, between the constraints of society that are internalized in the superego and associated with feelings of guilt, and, on the other hand, by the absence of restraints and push to satisfy sexual and aggressive drives of the id. The sense of guilt which follows deviation from or being tempted to deviate from social standards helps ensure that agents comply with social standards.
Cognitive Developmental Moral Theory. The cognitive developmental approach to moral judgment of Kohlberg (1969, 1971) assumes that the type of guilt associated with moral judgment changes over development in a way that reflects the individual's cognitive developmental stage. The most primitive form of guilt is seen as one that is linked to fear of sanctioning agents, a stage one form of reasoning. This early form of guilt, however, is viewed as spontaneously rejected by the adolescent who, in attaining higher stages of moral development experiences higher forms of guilt.

… each “higher” affect involves a cognitive differentiation not made by the next “lower” affect … guilt over violation of internal principles was assigned to Stage 6. Stage 4 guilt implies differentiating concern about one's responsibility according to rules from Stage 3, “shame” or concern about the diffuse disapproval of others. Stage 3 concern about disapproval is, in turn, a differentiation of Stage 1 and 2 concerns about overt reward and punishment characteristic of lower stages (Kohlberg, 1969, pp. 391-2).

In this model, it is assumed that once higher stages of morality have been attained, behavior is purely self-directed. To the extent that guilt is linked to an external sense of duty or obligation, it is assumed that it is experienced in a way that is controlling, oppressive, and thus non-satisfying. The form of guilt associated with the highest stage of moral development makes reference exclusively to the individual's moral principles and no longer to the rules or expectations of society.

Distinct Domain Perspective. The distinct domain perspective of Turiel and his colleagues (Nucci, 1996; Smetana, 1995; Turiel, 1983, 1998a) approaches guilt and satisfaction in a similar way as does the Kohlbergian model, even while forwarding a view in which morality, convention, and personal choice are seen as three distinct and coexisting domains of social knowledge, rather than as hierarchically ordered stages of moral development. For distinct domain theorists, as for Kohlberg, the Freudian account of guilt is seen as problematic in treating morality as affectively rather than cognitively grounded and in assuming that moral outlooks are based on conformity to societal demands. Within the distinct domain perspective, it is assumed that feelings of guilt can be associated with matters of social convention that are motivated by normative expectations. However, morality itself is viewed as based on standards that reflect the individual's cognitive appraisals of the consequences of behavior and that is not driven by social norms.

Within the distinct domain model, the role of affect in moral reasoning tends to be downplayed even more fully than within the Kohlbergian model. However, the assumption that aversive emotions such as guilt but not positive emotions such as satisfaction are associated with fulfilling normative expectations may be seen in the tendency from this perspective to stress the extent to which hierarchically structured role related duties oppress the autonomy of individuals in subordinate positions. Thus, for example, Wainryb and Turiel (Turiel, 1998b; Turiel & Wainryb, 1998; Wainryb & Turiel, 1994) present evidence to suggest that among the Druze women
tend to experience the existing gender base role expectations as unfair and to actively assert their desire for greater personal agency by resisting these expectations. In a study conducted among Indian adults and children, Neff (2001) likewise reports that greater emphasis is given to autonomy and privilege in the case of males, with greater emphasis placed on fulfilling interpersonal responsibilities in the case of females. The claim made in both of these investigations that even in collectivist cultures concerns with interpersonal responsibilities may be treated as less compelling than are personal preferences or self motivated goals, such as a wife's educational pursuits or pursuit of recreational activities, is non-controversial and, despite the authors' assertions, is compatible with the position of cultural theorists (Miller, 1997, 2006). However, what may be questioned in these accounts is the implicit assumption that, in fulfilling interpersonal responsibilities, particularly ones that are based on hierarchically based role expectations, agents are acting in a less agentic way than when undertaking behaviors that are not motivated by strong social expectations and thus in which less guilt would be expected.

**Morality of Caring.** In contrast to the Kohlbergian and distinct domain models which focus on issues of justice as central to morality, the morality of caring framework developed by Gilligan centers explicitly on interpersonal expectations to family and friends (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). While broadening the domain of what is seen as moral, Gilligan's approach shares the view of these earlier models, however, that hierarchically structured role expectations are oppressive and non-satisfying. This is seen in her claim that being oriented toward fulfilling such expectations represents an earlier developing and less adequate approach to caring than is a more voluntaristic approach that has transcended role expectations and its attendant feelings of guilt and pressure.

In a framework that has parallels to the Kohlbergian stage model with its distinction between the conventional and postconventional levels of moral reasoning, Gilligan portrays the morality of caring as developing from an earlier conventionally oriented stance that is oppressive to the self to a fully moral stance characterized by greater agency and in which the individual can potentially experience greater satisfaction. As seen in the illustrative response below of a female respondent who has not yet attained this higher level of caring, basing one's moral outlook on role expectations is assumed to represent a non-agentic and selfless stance:

> I see myself as an onion, as a block of different layers. The external layers are for people that I don't know well, the agreeable, the social, and as you go inward, there are more sides for people I know that I show. I am not sure about the innermost, whether there is a core, or whether I have just picked up everything as I was growing up, these different influences (Gilligan, 1982, pp. 67-68).

In contrast, as reflected in the outlook below of a different respondent, the fully mature form of the morality of caring is no longer oriented toward meeting social expectations:
Examining the assumptions underlying the conventions of female self-abnegation and moral self-sacrifice, she rejects these conventions as immoral in their power to hurt ... Care then becomes a ... self-chosen ethic which, freed from its conventional interpretation, leads to a recasting of the dilemma in a way that allows the assumption of responsibility for choice (Gilligan, 1982, p. 90) (emphasis added).

In Gilligan’s approach the assumption is made that mature caring entails a sense of choice and thus of true satisfaction, that is only attainable once the individual is no longer acting in response to social role expectations, with its attendant emotion of guilt.

**Motivation**

The same type of assumption that links an overt emphasis on social expectations to a lesser sense of agency and that assumes that there is a negative relationship between guilt and satisfaction may be seen in self determination theory, one of the most influential contemporary models of motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1990; Ryan & Deci, 2006). Self determination theory accounts for how agents can experience agency while engaging in behaviors that they are not necessarily intrinsically motivated to undertake and thus represents a theory that is readily applicable to moral behavior. The model offers a framework which, like the theories of moral development discussed, assumes that the endpoint of development in which the individual experiences the greatest satisfaction and sense of agency is one in which they have overcome a sense of guilt and social pressure and experience their behavior as totally self directed.

Within self-determination theory, it is assumed that over time individuals increasingly identify with social expectations so that subjectively they come to experience these constraints in a highly agentic way. It is assumed that prior to internalization, individuals approach social expectations in terms of an “external” motivational stance, in which they experience expectations in controlling terms and are focused on sanctions and conformity. As they begin to internalize social expectations, individuals experience what is considered to be an “introjected” motivational stance, characterized by a concern with obtaining self/other approval and with the affective experience of guilt. However, once expectations have been internalized, individuals experience an “identified” stance in which they come to personally value or identify with the expectations. It is only at this stage that individuals experience their behaviors in agentic terms as fully satisfying.

Within this framework, it is assumed that once social expectations have been fully internalized, individuals are now motivated purely by internal motivational factors and no longer by external motivational factors, such as social expectations and a sense of guilt. This assumption that there is an inverse relationship between being motivated by guilt and by a concern with fulfilling social expectations and the expe...
rience of satisfaction can be seen in the scale measures developed from this perspective to tap motivation. Thus, to illustrate, in the Self-Regulation Questionnaire on Friendship, individuals are asked to rate the importance of four reasons for why they listen to their friend’s problems (http://psych.rochester.edu/SDT/measures/selfregfrnd.html). On this scale, the reasons of “It’s interesting and satisfying to be able to share like that” (intrinsic) and of “Because I really value getting to know my friend better” (identified) are considered internal whereas the reasons of guilt (“Because I would feel guilty if I did not” (introjected) and of external reinforcement (“Because my friend praises me and makes me feel good when I do”) are considered external.

The assumption that satisfaction and guilt are inversely related may be seen in the scoring system for the scale, which computes an overall agency score by subtracting the external responses, which include guilt, from the internal responses, which include satisfaction.

When applied to interpreting cultural variation in role related duties, the perspective of self determination theory comes to a similar conclusion as do theorists from a distinct domain perspective in assuming that a stronger sense of agency is associated with the more egalitarian practices emphasized in individualistic cultures (Chirkov & Ryan, 2001). To the extent that individuals are placing an overt emphasis on meeting hierarchically structured role based expectations in explaining their own behavior, they are assumed to have less fully internalized cultural expectations and to have a lesser sense of agency than do individuals whose outlook is based on more egalitarian normative expectations. Congruent with these claims, results utilizing the standard scales associated with self determination theory have produced findings that suggest that the types of horizontal cultural practices associated with individualism are more readily internalized than are the vertical cultural practices associated with collectivism (Chirkov, Ryan, & Willness, 2005; Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, & Kaplan, 2003).

Summary

Major psychological theories of moral development and of motivation share the view that satisfaction is linked to fulfilling social expectations only to the extent that these expectations are experienced as self-chosen and are not associated with a sense of guilt that is linked to external standards. To the extent that individuals view their behavior as undertaken in response to hierarchically structured social expectations it is assumed that they will tend to experience less satisfaction and a lesser sense of agency. From this perspective the assumption is made that the hierarchical role-related outlooks emphasized in collectivist cultures and reflected in individuals’ everyday attributions (e.g., Bond, 1983, Miller, 1984) tend to be experienced in somewhat oppressive terms.
Relationship of Guilt to Satisfaction in Cultural Context

Traditional India regards duty as emanating from one’s nature—one can’t help doing it—while the Western idea of duty requires a struggle against oneself, and the idea of “glad concurrence” is far less prominent in Western attitudes to duty than is the image of bitter medicine (O’Flaherty & Derrett, 1978, p. xix).

Cultural variation exists in perceptions of the self’s relationship to the social order. Research suggests that in cultural contexts in which there is less of a perceived tension or opposition between the self and the social order a greater tendency exists to view the fulfillment of social expectations as linked to guilt while also satisfying.

Satisfaction, Guilt and Choice

Cross-cultural research has documented a greater tendency for adult respondents from more collectivist cultural communities to associate satisfaction with fulfilling interpersonal responsibilities to family and friends, even while showing a greater tendency than do European American respondents to treat such responsibilities in obligatory terms. Thus, for example, as compared to U.S. students, Brazilian students report more frequently being influenced by social expectations in responding to requests for aid from family members while also reporting greater enjoyment in helping than do US students (Bontempo, Lobel, & Triandis, 1990). Likewise, in a study that utilized a between-participant design, it was found that both European-American and Hindu Indian respondents view agents as more influenced by social expectations in rendering help to a neighbor in a baseline condition in which the neighbor has helped them in the past, than in rendering help to a neighbor in a baseline condition in which there has been no prior reciprocity (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). However, whereas US respondents consider it more satisfying to help in the absence as compared with presence of social expectations, Indian respondents consider it equally satisfying to help in both cases. In comparisons undertaken of different ethnic groups within the US, it has also been observed that, as compared with US Anglo students, US Latino students report a stronger feeling that they “should” help more distant family and friends, while also maintaining a greater desire to help them (Janoff-Bulman & Leggatt, 2002).

Evidence that these types of cultural differences reflect cultural variation in the tendency to view role related duties to family and friends as congruent with the self may be seen in the representative open-ended responses presented below, given by European-American and Hindu Indian respondents to a hypothetical situation involving high cost helping (Miller & Bersoff, 1995). The helping portrayed a wife who continued to care for, rather than abandoning, her husband after he became paralyzed and mentally impaired after a motorcycle accident. While acknowledging the difficulty of the situation confronting the wife, the Indian respondent associated
satisfaction with fulfilling her duties to be responsive to her husband’s welfare and with being able to adjust to the challenges of life:

She will have the satisfaction of having fulfilled her duty. She helped her husband during difficulty. If difficulties and happiness are both viewed as equal, only then will the family life be smooth (ibid, p. 275).

In contrast, as seen in the prototypical US response below, there was a greater tendency among the US respondents to view the sense of duty that the wife felt towards her husband as oppressive, and in tension with her personal needs and desires:

She is acting out of obligation—not other reasons like love. She has a sense of duty but little satisfaction for her own happiness (ibid).

Recent research has further shown that European-American respondents link a feeling of being compelled to help to cases in which helping a friend is strongly social expected and of choosing to help to cases in which the social expectation to help is weak (Miller, 2003, Miller, Das, & Chakravarthy, 2008). In contrast, Hindu Indian respondents associate a feeling of choosing to help with both situations. It was also documented that among US respondents, guilt is negatively associated with satisfaction, while, among Indian respondents guilt has a positive relationship to satisfaction. This sense of choice associated by Hindu Indians with duty resembles the sense of choice experienced by US respondents in the context of the parent infant bond, a perceived natural role (Schneider, 1968). Just as a US parent may experience caring for their newborn as a matter of duty that is freely accepted and that tends to be experienced as satisfying, Indians tend to associate a sense of satisfaction and of choice with fulfillment of duty in a wider range of in-group relationships.

**Developmental Considerations**

Questions arise concerning how this type of motivational outlook develops that links a felt sense of responsibility with a sense of satisfaction and perceived freely given adherence to social expectations. Available research suggests that it may arise through cultural practices that promote voluntary cooperation. While significant variation exists in the nature of child socialization practices in different cultural contexts, certain common practices involving voluntary cooperation have been documented in a range of collectivist cultures that appear linked to this type of outlook.

Research conducted in Japan, for example, indicates that a stance of being voluntarily cooperative, *sunao*, tends to be promoted through patterns of interactions with young children that elicit voluntary compliance with social expectations. As White and LeVine observe:

*A child who is *sunao* has not yielded his or her personal autonomy for the sake of cooperation; cooperation does not suggest giving up the self as it may in the*
West; it implies that working with others is the appropriate way of enhancing the self (White & LeVine, 1986, p. 58).

Thus, for example, the mother’s displays of empathy toward the child and of encouraging the child empathy for and identification with her feelings has the effect of promoting the child’s understanding and acceptance of social expectations (Lebra, 1994; Lewis, 1995). The child comes to feel a strong directive to comply with social requirements that may entail a sense of guilt but that is also experienced as integral to self.

In research conducted among US and Guatemalan Mayan middle class mothers, Mosier and Rogoff (2003) likewise document that the patterns of socialization of toddlers emphasized in each community appears linked to contrasting outlooks on responsibility. Among the Guatemalan Mayan mothers, the dominant socialization practice is to indulge younger toddlers through more lenient application of rules to them than to older children. This contrasts with the pattern observed among the US mothers which is more egalitarian and involves stricter application of rules to younger as compared with older children. The Guatemalan practice is linked to the development of outlooks in which children come to develop a voluntaristic attitude toward cooperation with social expectations, which entails not only a strong sense of “individual freedom of choice in support of responsibility” (Mosier & Rogoff, 2003, pp. 1056-7) but also the assumption of responsibility for major caregiving and economic chores within the community. In contrast, the US socialization practices tend to be associated with the development of a model of fairness in family relations in which children are more inclined to stand up for their self interests and to view social expectations as oppressive, while also assuming less responsibility in the family than do the Guatemalan children.

Notably, recent research conducted on parent-adolescent dispute resolution among Hindu Indian families reveals a similar emphasis on voluntary compliance with the expectations of parents (Kapadia & Miller, 2005). Hindu Indian adolescents, in which family relations are treated as contexts involving mutual responsibility and concern. Thus, for example, when reacting to a hypothetical case involving parents who were against their child's marriage because it was inter-caste, a 16 year old Indian male responded that while he expected compromise, not the imposition of authority on the part of his parents, he would ultimately defer to their wishes, not out of a sense of forced compliance, but as a reflection of the positive feelings and sense of respect he has for them:

Q Say if this situation were to arise in your house. How would it be dealt with?
R I think my parents would resolve the situation. They will talk to her parents and I mean the matter will be resolved … and there will be no need of breaking up. They will allow me to marry.
Q Say in your case, your parents do not give you the permission to get married. What happens then?
R I would do what my parents say because I don’t want to hurt them. I love them and they will do what is right for me. (Kapadia & Miller, p. 46-47).

As this example illustrates, children in this type of cultural setting come to identify with the authority of their parents and with larger social expectations through developing outlooks in which core social expectations and duties that apply to family and friend relations have been internalized so that acting to fulfill one’s duty tends to be experienced as legitimate and as congruent with the needs and interests of self.

Dissent

In noting that duty and guilt may be associated with satisfaction in the context of ingroup role relationships, it should be emphasized that no claim is being made that fulfilling social expectations is always satisfying or never associated with dissent. Cultural research suggests rather that even in cultural contexts which tend to approach duty as more congruent with rather than opposed to self, individuals experience some dissatisfaction with social requirements and may resist them. However, notably such dissent shows a stronger tendency to be directed toward goals that remain grounded in social expectations rather than to be directed toward the goals of greater freedom of choice as observed in individualistic cultural communities.

In research contrasting the outlooks on family and work roles among middle age US and Japanese women, Schaberg (2002) demonstrated that while concerns with securing greater equality and fairness tended to be emphasized by both groups of women in the context of work place relations, the women held markedly different outlooks in regard to marriage.

Among the US respondents, the ideal form of marriage was seen as one that entails equality between husbands and wives. The US women placed more emphasis than did the Japanese women on the perceived restrictive nature of social roles. As a US respondent argued:

I don’t really like the word “responsibilities”. It just strikes me as, well, that I have responsibilities to my children, but not to my husband (p. 66).

In contrast, among the Japanese respondents ideal family relations were seen as involving interdependencies, with the system of hierarchically structured mutual responsibilities within the marriage regarded as bringing certain advantages. As a Japanese respondent explained:

I believe that men and women are fundamentally different and hopefully there is a feeling that by joining together it will bring some advantages (p. 67).

In describing what they considered problematic about marriage, the Japanese respondents did not challenge the validity of the differential role expectations between husbands and wives, which they accepted as legitimate, but made reference to the
strains that they experienced at times in managing social expectations. As a Japanese respondent explained in describing this type of stress:

Well, it isn't just the relationship between husband and wife, you must consider the family as well, his parents and siblings. This can get a bit complicated (p. 68).

In sum, while the Japanese, like the US respondents, registered dissent against their cultural practices, they were not articulating the same concerns. In viewing inequality in the roles of husband and wife as oppressive, US respondents called for greater individual freedom for the woman in the marriage and less social constraint. In contrast, in accepting the hierarchical structure of spousal relationships as appropriate if not also as natural, Japanese respondents did not call for an escape from the demands of the wife role but for ways to make it function more smoothly.

Summary

Cultural research indicates a tendency in collectivist cultures for fulfilling duties to family and friends to be treated as satisfying, even while being associated with feelings of guilt. Contrary to assumptions that this type of motivational orientation is socialized through controlling social practices, evidence indicates that it is linked to patterns of child socialization that involve considerable accommodation and mutuality. Research also suggests that dissent tends to be expressed in ways that assume the legitimacy of hierarchically structured social practices, at least in the domain of family relations.

Implications

In conclusion, the present discussion highlights the need to give greater attention to the contrasting meanings accorded to satisfaction and guilt in the context of duty. It suggests that in collectivist cultural communities, duties to family and friends are perceived to have more positive connotations than is observed in more individualistic cultural settings. Duties tend not only to be experienced as objective requirements that are associated with guilt but as sources of individual satisfaction. In contrast, in more individualistic cultural settings, there is a greater tendency to experience satisfaction in being responsive to the needs of family and friends when acting, not out of a sense of obligation, but in a way that is experienced as more autonomous from social expectations.

The present considerations call into question the characterization of collectivist outlooks found in work in the tradition of individualism/collectivism (see also critiques in Miller, 2002; Mosier & Rogoff, 2003). In the definitions forwarded of collectivism and in the types of items included on individualism-collectivism scale measures, there has been a tendency to associate agency exclusively with individualism and to portray collectivism as a stance that entails the subordination of self to the group (e.g. Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk,, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995). However, in documenting that
Role obligations may be experienced as satisfying even as they are associated with social demands and with feelings of guilt, the present considerations suggest that a strong sense of self and agency is present in collectivist cultures.

Methodologically, the present considerations also highlight the need for more culturally sensitive methods to tap outlooks on role-related duties. In regard to motivation, for example, the scale measures utilized in the tradition of self determination theory have tended to tap issues of duty or obligation in terms of scale items that make reference to punishment. They also are keyed in such a way that any items referring to duty are assumed apriori to represent external or introjected motives rather than internalized reasons. Such a categorization, however, does not take into account that, particularly in collectivist cultures, complying with social expectations may be based on motives that are more internalized than mere social conformity, even as they also involve feelings of guilt.

In regard to research on morality and dissent, the present considerations also highlight the importance of tapping issues in more ecologically valid ways to avoid overstating the extent of dissatisfaction with hierarchically structured social practices. In studies that have suggested that women from collectivist cultures find the hierarchically structured gender expectations of marriage as unfair, there has been a tendency to focus primarily on the responsibilities in the family of the husband. For example, in the study conducted among Hindu Indian women by Neff (2001), the wife condition of a vignette, in one case, portrays a wife who wants to relax and watch TV in the evenings rather than cook dinner for her husband, a stance which represents a violation of a gender based expectation associated with the role of wife. However, the paired vignette in the husband condition portrays a husband who wants to read a book and relax in the evening rather than do the shopping for his wife, a stance which does not represent a violation of a gender based expectation associated with the husband role. It is premature to conclude that women assume the preponderance of responsibilities in the family and that the male role is primarily one of privilege, without fully tapping the gender-based obligations of males in the family and not only those of females.

In conclusion, in highlighting the extent to which outlooks on duty, satisfaction, and guilt are culturally variable, the findings discussed point to the need to broaden present understandings of the forms of motivation associated with fulfilling social expectations. They also underscore the importance of research that explores the structure of affective experiences in different cultural contexts, research which to date notably has documented a tendency for positive and negative affect to show stronger positive relationships to each other among East Asian as compared with Western cultural populations (e.g., Bagozzi, Wong, & Yi, 1999). Importantly, however, the evidence reviewed also implies that cultural variation in the interrelationship of guilt and satisfaction is less a case of opposite emotions covarying in collectivist cultures, a case that might be explicable in terms of a holistic cognitive style (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), as a reflection of monistic cultural outlooks (Marriott, 1990) that stress the inherent compatibility of the individual and the social order.
References


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