

- Srivastava, A. K., & Misra, G. (1999). An Indian perspective on understanding intelligence. In W. J. Lonner, D. L. Dinnel, D. K. Forgays, & S. A. Hayes (Eds.), *Merging past, present, and future in cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 159-172). Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1985). *Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1988a). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & E. E. Smith (Eds.), *The psychology of thought* (pp. 267-308). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1988b). A triarchic view of intelligence in cross-cultural perspective. In S. H. Irvine & J. W. Berry (Eds.), *Human abilities in cultural context* (pp. 60-85). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Sue, D. W., & Sue, D. (1999). *Counseling the culturally different* (3rd ed). New York: Wiley.
- Triandis, H. C. (1972). *The analysis of subjective culture*. New York: Wiley.
- Triandis, H. C., Lambert, W., Berry, J. W., Lonner, W. J., Heron, A., Brislin, R. W., & Draguns, J. G. (Eds.). (1980). *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology* (Vols. 1-6). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
- Tyler, F. B. (2001). *Cultures, communities, competence, and change*. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
- Walters, J., & Gardner, H. (1986). The crystallizing experience: Discovering an intellectual gift. In R. J. Sternberg & J. E. Davidson (Eds.), *Conceptions of giftedness* (pp. 411-455). London: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, C. (2001). The ABC's of acculturation. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *Handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 411-445). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Witkin, H. A., & Berry, J. W. (1975). Psychological differentiation in cross-cultural perspective. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 6, 4-82.
- Witkin, H. A., Dyk, R. B., Faterson, H. F., Goodenough, D. R., & Karp, S. A. (1962). *Psychological differentiation*. New York: Wiley.

5

THE CULTURAL DEEP STRUCTURE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

JOAN G. MILLER

Psychological theories of social development not only describe behavior but also include prescriptive assumptions about what constitutes more or less adequate or mature modes of psychological functioning. In this respect, they offer visions of social competence that complement those that are offered by psychological theories of intelligence. As is observed in the area of intelligence, individual differences on psychological measures of social development tend to be positively correlated and to predict real-life adaptive outcomes.

In the present chapter, I argue that theories of social development need to be seen as resembling theories of intelligence in being informed by shared conceptual premises that contribute to their intercorrelations with each other and to their predictive power. The case is made that the dominant psychological theories of social development are informed by problems for the self that are salient in the middle-class European American cultural setting in which psychology to date has largely developed. Thus, the correlations among different measures of social development result, in part, from the theories being based on a common conceptual definition of competence rather than

exclusively from empirical relationships existing among them. Evidence is presented to suggest that this conceptual definition of competence does not adequately represent the beliefs and values of diverse cultural and socioeconomic subgroups and, as a result, leads to such groups, in cases, being appraised as showing less developed forms of competence than are displayed by middle-class European Americans. The conclusion is drawn regarding the need to broaden psychological definitions of social competence to tap the contrasting beliefs, values, and problems for the self that are salient in different cultural and subcultural communities, with such efforts contributing to the enhancement of basic psychological theory.

The chapter is organized into three sections. In the first section, I consider respects in which concerns with cultural insularity have been raised in the case of theories of intelligence—concerns that in many ways provide a model for the related issues that exist in the case of theories of social development. In the second section, I argue that, although it is not generally recognized, psychological theories of social development share a common culturally grounded conceptual structure related to balancing autonomy and relatedness. In turn, in the last section, I present evidence suggesting that this conceptual structure is conceptually inadequate to capture various outlooks on social development that are emphasized within diverse cultural and subcultural communities.

THE CULTURAL GROUNDING OF THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE

Psychological theories of intelligence provide a useful example for illustrating respects in which theories may form closed systems, in which their explanatory force and predictive power derive, in part, from their grounding in conceptual assumptions that favor the perspective of particular cultural or subcultural populations. In contrast to the case of theories of social development, in which there has been little attention to the existence of a common culturally based deep structure as characterizing diverse frameworks, the problem of potentially culturally bound views of intelligence has been subject to extensive debate. This debate centers on the issue of how to define intelligence and on how to interpret the associations observed between intelligence and everyday adaptation.

In terms of defining intelligence, it is widely accepted that intelligence involves an evaluative appraisal of experience. As Hasham and Baron (1994) observed, "intelligence clearly refers to abilities, properties of performance that can be evaluated along a continuum from better to worse" (p. 41). Intelligence furthermore is identified with adaptation, a stance seen in Pinner's early definition of intelligence as the ability "to adapt (one)self adequately to relatively new situations in life" (Pinner, 1921, p. 139). Recognizing that what is adaptive varies with the resources and values of different communi-

ties, culturally based approaches to intelligence accept that the content of intelligent behavior is necessarily culturally variable to a significant degree (e.g., Ceci, 1990; Charlesworth, 1976). However, the views of intelligence emphasized in the psychometric tradition of IQ testing, views that presently are the most influential both within the field and within the larger society, typically reject such a conclusion. Rather, they forward content-based definitions of intelligence that privilege the types of abstract abilities that appear on IQ tests. These abilities are seen as reflecting a capacity factor, g , that is assumed to underlie individual differences in performance not only on intelligence tests but also in everyday life.

Given these assumptions, the predictive power of measures of IQ or g become crucial as an index of the validity of conceptions of intelligence. As Eysenck has argued, "... we would feel disinclined to call something intelligence that did not correlate with external criteria, such as success at school and university, or in life or at work" (Eysenck, 1979, p. 78). However, as seen later in this chapter, although there is evidence that IQ predicts consequential adaptive outcomes, this does not settle the issue of the validity and cultural adequacy of conceptions of intelligence. Rather, the findings give rise to questions about the meaning of the observed associations between IQ and adaptive outcomes.

As support for the construct validity and cultural adequacy of existing conceptions of intelligence, theorists within the psychometric tradition point to findings indicating that intelligence tests show high interrelationship with each other and with valued outcomes. For example, it is found that if results of batteries of standard intelligence tests are factor analyzed, a first-principal component emerges that accounts for approximately 30% of the variance—a component believed to reflect the general intelligence factor, g (Ceci, 1990). Furthermore, IQ predicts more than merely academic success, such as higher grades in school, greater number of years of school completed, and higher standardized test scores. It also predicts a range of consequential life outcomes, including lower criminality, better mental health, lower marriage dissolution rates, and higher levels of occupational attainment (e.g., Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989; Hunt, 1995; Hunter, 1986). Theorists within the psychometric tradition interpret this type of evidence as reflecting the centrality of IQ in enabling individuals to adapt in flexible and effective ways with environmental demands. As Izakoff (1989) concludes, "Persons with high g can restrain themselves to do many different tasks in one lifetime and often at a highly creative level" (p. 85).

Theorists identified with culturally based approaches to intelligence, in contrast, do not question the existence of this type of evidence nor dismiss it as inconsequential, but rather raise concerns about the extent to which the association between IQ and valued adaptive outcomes arises, at least in part, from *a priori* linkages in the ways in which intelligence is defined and measured and the behavioral indices of adaptive performance adopted as out-

come criteria. It is noted that the items that were sampled on the first intelligence test, which was developed by Binet, and that resemble those found in most contemporary intelligence tests, were selected because they were observed to be successful in predicting school outcomes. This then introduces circularity into IQ measures if they are used to predict school performance or other related outcomes, because a criterion that was used initially in developing the tests is now being treated as evidence of the test's predictive power. In turn, the predictive power of psychometric definitions of intelligence is magnified as this definition of intelligence is adopted in assessing intelligence on a wide range of diagnostic tests used in schools and work settings. Thus, for example, contemporary United States admissions tests for college (SAT, ACT), graduate (GRE), and professional schools (LSAT, GMA, MCAT) all tap intellectual abilities in ways that closely resemble those used on IQ measures.

The circularity of associations between performance on IQ-type measures and everyday adaptive outcomes, in turn, is viewed as further heightened by the gatekeeping role of school performance and performance on intelligence test type measures on valued outcomes (Ceci, 1990). Society selects candidates for higher educational opportunities or career advancement, in part, on the basis of their having strong academic records and high test performance. As a consequence, it is only individuals with high achievement in school and on standardized intelligence test type measures who are admitted to elite positions in society. Once admitted to these positions, they tend to be accorded preferential treatment, in terms of having greater resources and opportunities for advancement, whereas individuals who score poorly tend to suffer disadvantages. As Sternberg points out, in thus providing individuals who score well on intelligence tests with societal advantages, while handicapping those who score poorly, the performance gap between high and low test performers is heightened and the tests themselves contribute to producing gaps in individuals' levels of achievement and societal outcomes:

Low test scores set in motion a chain of events that can lead to poor later outcomes, independent of the abilities the tests measure. Once a child is labeled as stupid, his opportunities start to dry up. . . . Labels are not just descriptions of reality; they contribute toward shaping reality. (Sternberg, 1996, p. 23)

The observation then that individuals of middle- or upper-middle-class background tend to have higher IQ than individuals of working or lower class occupations becomes, in part, an artifact of the gatekeeping structure of societal institutions in only admitting individuals who score well on intelligence test type measures. In turn, evidence of better life outcomes, such as lower criminality or greater mental health and marital success, being linked to higher IQ, may also be seen to reflect, in part, the greater societal advantages enjoyed by individuals of middle class background. These are the groups who

tend to perform at superior levels in school and to score higher on IQ-type indices and thus to be accorded more opportunities for advancement.

Perhaps the strongest type of argument for the limited predictive power of IQ measures, beyond performances that are correlated with school-type skills, however, is that IQ measures do not predict well performance in everyday contexts that draw on different types of abilities (Ceci, 1990; Labortory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983; Miller, 1997; Sternberg, 1996). Thus, for example, it has been shown that IQ is not related to competent performance in such everyday settings as betting at a racetrack, efficiently distributing goods within a factory, or budgeting expenses at the grocery store (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Schleimann, Carragher, & Ceci, 1997; Scribner, 1984). In such contexts, it is observed that quality of performance tends to be related to task-specific expertise that draws on a broader range of competencies than those tapped by traditional IQ measures and that is enhanced by experience or practice within the activity.

Evidence of this type has led critics to argue for the need to conceptually broaden conceptions of intelligence to tap a wider range of competencies. Such an argument is forwarded by Sternberg (1985, 1988), for example, in his triarchic theory of intelligence, a framework that portrays intelligence as encompassing not merely analytic skills but also synthetic or creative abilities as well as street smarts or practical intelligence. It also represents an insight that underlies the proposal by Gardner (1983, 1993) to expand conceptions of intelligence to encompass a variety of different types of skills, ranging from artistic to musical abilities. Finally, this type of conceptual argument has informed the growing interest among psychologists in examining lay conceptions of intelligence in an attempt to identify new dimensions of intelligence that, although they are not tapped in present definitions of IQ, are integral to everyday adaptation in different sociocultural settings (e.g., Grigorenko et al., 2001; Sternberg, Conway, Ketrin, & Bernstein, 1981).

In sum, work on intelligence highlights the need to broaden contemporary definitions of intelligence to take into account intellectual competencies that are considered important to everyday adaptation in different social and cultural settings but that are not represented in psychometric theories of intelligence or in intelligence test measures. This work also points to the biases that ensue from a failure to broaden definitions of intelligence. In particular, limitations in predictive power occur, as psychometric definitions of intelligence fail to relate to intelligent performance in everyday contexts that require different types of abilities than those that appear on IQ-type measures. Also, group bias arises as the narrow constructs tapped on IQ-type measures tend to be privileged by societal institutions, with only individuals or groups who display these types of abilities accorded societal advantages and individuals or groups who emphasize other types of abilities experiencing some disadvantage.

These types of problems that arise in the case of intelligence, however, are not unique to this domain but rather reflect a stance that I argue also

exists in other work on competence. This type of stance more generally arises whenever a narrow definition of competence is treated as the normative criterion that is privileged in psychological theories and in society more generally. Once this stance has been adopted, multiple measures that are informed by this same construct will tend to be highly correlated with each other. Also, to the extent that societal structures are premised on the same values, significant correlations will be observed between everyday adaptive outcomes and these constructs. However, as observed in the case of theories of intelligence, this type of system also will tend to be severely limited in its power to predict adaptation in contexts that value different types of abilities. It will also tend to disadvantage individuals or groups who emphasize alternative forms of competence.

In the next section, I show that this same type of analysis can be applied in understanding the need for conceptual broadening of contemporary psychological theories of social development. Through comparison of respects in which theories of social development, like theories of intelligence, privilege narrow definitions of competence, insight can be gained into the extent that this issue of conceptual and cultural bias arises in the case of a wide range of social theories. It becomes equally clear that the same strategies being adopted to conceptually broaden theories of intelligence may also be relevant to conceptually broadening theories of social development.

THE CULTURAL GROUNDING OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Like theories of intelligence, theories of social development center on explaining what constitutes more or less successful adaptation. However, whereas the criterion of adaptation in theories of intelligence tends to be formulated in a highly general way, such as the ability to adapt flexibly to environmental challenges, the criteria adopted in the case of theories of social development are content specific. Thus, for example, theories of parenting are concerned with explaining more or less successful parenting, whereas theories of motivation are concerned with explaining more or less adaptive motivation. Although acknowledging this content specificity, I argue here that on a somewhat implicit level, psychological theories of social development share a common deep conceptual structure that links them with each other. This shared conceptual structure functions in a way that, in many respects, resembles the construct of *g* in the case of intelligence. It contributes to the tendencies of the theories of social development to show strong intercorrelation as well as to have high predictive power, at the same time that it limits their explanatory force in accounting for modes of social development emphasized in diverse sociocultural settings.

The dominant contemporary psychological theories of social development may be seen to reflect problems for the self that are salient in the individualistic, middle-class, European American cultural context that has been adopted as the default standard for normative models of human development in psychology. These problems concern effecting a balance between autonomy and relatedness. As anthropologists have noted, the modern Western view of self that is prominent in middle-class European American culture includes not only an emphasis on autonomy but also a tension in relation to the collective (e.g., Farr, 1991; Taylor, 1989). Within such a view, agency comes to be identified with internal psychological characteristics and to be regarded as opposed to the demands of the social context:

An analytic framework that equates "self/individual" with such things as spontaneity, genuine feeling, privacy, uniqueness, constancy, the "inner life" and then opposes those to mask, role, rule or context is a reflection of dichotomies that constitute the modern Western self. (Rosaldo, 1984, p. 146)

This type of cultural outlook gives rise to an ambivalence about social demands, with the collective regarded, on the one hand, as necessary for individual survival, while, on the other hand, as a constraint on individual autonomy. As Plath (1980) observed, "our cultural nightmare is that the individual throb of growth will be sucked dry in slavish social conformity. All life long, our central struggle is to defend the individual from the collective" (p. 216). In such a stance, it is assumed that adaptation requires a certain balancing of self that weighs responsiveness to the requirements of the social whole with individuality.

Just as the type of abstract abilities that comprise *g* are reflected in psychometric theories of intelligence, this type of cultural concern with effecting a balance between the self and the social whole is increasingly being reflected in general psychological conceptions of healthy human functioning. Thus, for example, Guisinger and Blatt (1994) have proposed that individuality and relatedness are both integral to personality development: "... we need to recognize that healthy personality development involves equal and complementary emphasis on individuality and relatedness for both men and women" (pp. 108-109). Likewise, Bakan (1966) argued for the importance of balancing concerns with self with human connection. As Spence (1985) commented in characterizing Bakan's position:

In his book, *The Duality of Human Existence*, Bakan proposed two fundamental but antagonistic senses: A sense of self (or agency), manifested in self-assertiveness and self-protectiveness, and a sense of selflessness (or communion), the desire to become one with others. (p. 1290)

As she further observed, the developmental task according to Bakan is "to reconcile and balance these two contradictory senses." As a balance, the

optimum stance is considered to be one that combines elements of each while avoiding extremes. On the one hand, an extreme stance is associated with too much self-assertiveness, a position that is insufficiently social, if not out of control. On the other hand, an extreme stance is also associated with too much connectedness, a position that is insufficiently autonomous and susceptible to excessive social control.

In the discussion below, I show that this vision about the need to balance autonomy with relatedness has come to have a major role in contemporary psychological theories of social development, forming the deep structure of a range of specific theories, in a way that parallels that of the construct of *g*, constituting the deep structure of psychometrically based theories of intelligence. Focus here centers on major contemporary psychological models of attachment, social motivation, parenting, and interpersonal morality. In each case, one sees that a significant part of the theoretical contribution and appeal of the model under consideration is its offer of a way to resolve this problem of integrating autonomy and relatedness. In defining individual differences or levels of developmental competence, each theory identifies less adaptive stances that give too much weight either to individual autonomy or to social relatedness and contrasts them with an optimum stance that embodies a balance between autonomy and relatedness.

Attachment

The model of attachment forwarded by Bowlby, Ainsworth, and their colleagues constitutes one of the most influential contemporary psychological theories of personality, social, and developmental psychology (Ainsworth, 1978; Bowlby, 1969–1980). Attachment is viewed as fundamental to all social relationships, with attachment behaviors implicated not only in the young child's formation of a bond with his or her primary caregiver but also in the mediation of other close relationships. The domain of attachment research has expanded from a consideration only of early parent–infant relationships to a consideration of the attachments that individuals form with their romantic partners, spouses, and other significant others (e.g., Fraley, 2002). The assumption is made of longitudinal stability in styles of attachment across the life span and of the centrality of attachment relationships to success in other areas of social life.

As formulated by Bowlby, attachment theory centers on the child's bond with his or her caregiver, with attachment behaviors being those that allow the infant to seek and maintain proximity to this figure. Attachment behaviors are considered to have evolutionary roots in the infant's initial state of dependency and inability to flee unaided from predators or other dangers. The attachment system exists alongside other behavioral subsystems within the developing infant, with the pull to remain attached to the caregiver set against other goals, such as exploration, that are also critical to survival. The

infant and the caregiver coordinate their behavioral tendencies in such a way that proximity to the caregiver is assured under conditions of danger or threat, yet exploration of the environment is enabled and promoted to the maximum degree.

Related to issues of survival, attachment is a universal aspect of human experience and, in this sense, represents a cross-culturally robust phenomenon. In all viable human communities, attachment is achieved in a way that ensures human growth and adaptation. However, the thrust of psychological research on attachment centers on the quality of attachment and not merely on its presence. With the development of the Strange Situation assessment procedure (Ainsworth, 1978), and with the theoretical emphasis placed on clinical issues, psychological work on attachment has developed into a tripartite theory of individual differences that maps closely onto the adaptive problem for the self discussed earlier.¹

The attachment model of individual differences posits a behavioral continuum characterized by less adaptive orientations at two opposing poles and an optimum adaptive orientation at its midpoint. The Group A or *anxious-avoidant* pattern of attachment forms one of the poles. Arising in the case of infants who have experienced rebuff or rejection in having their attachment needs met in a responsive way, this pattern of behavior is marked by defensive avoidance. In turn, the Group C or *anxious-resistant* pattern forms the other pole. This pattern arises in cases in which infants have experienced inappropriate or inconsistent responsiveness by the caregiver, leading them to develop a wariness of exploration. Finally, the Group B or *secure* pattern forms the midpoint of the continuum and constitutes the optimum stance. This pattern arises in cases in which infants have experienced consistent responsiveness from the caregiver, leading to the development of a representation of the caregiver as a secure base that allows exploration of the environment and affiliation with others.

This individual difference model of attachment, it may be seen, is framed in terms of the issue of balancing autonomy and relatedness discussed earlier. Specifically, the A pattern of attachment constitutes a stance that gives too much weight to autonomy at the expense of relatedness. As seen in the Strange Situation research procedure, the A type infant freely explores the lab in the absence of his or her caregiver, but embodies a deficit in connection, showing little or no distress at the caregiver's absence or affection toward the caregiver on his or her return to the lab. In turn, the C pattern of attachment reflects a stance that gives too much weight to relatedness at the expense of autonomy. As seen in the Strange Situation paradigm, the C type infant becomes overly distressed at his or her caregiver's absence, a level of distress that precludes him or her from being able to explore successfully in the

¹A category of Group D or "disorganized/disorganized" attachment patterns was later added to this scheme to capture the experience of infants experiencing severe abuse or neglect.

caregiver's absence or to affiliate with others. Finally, the B pattern of secure attachment represents a stance that successfully bridges these two poles and that allows for both autonomy and relatedness. Secure in his or her representation of the caregiver, the B type infant remains emotionally connected with his or her caregiver, at the same time that he or she has the confidence to explore the environment.

Social Motivation

For many years, a gap existed in psychological theories of social motivation, in terms of accounting for the motivation that individuals experience in meeting social role expectations. The contribution of self-determination theory (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991) was in filling this theoretical gap by forwarding a model that made it possible to account for compliance with social expectations in a way that embodied agency.

Early theories of intrinsic motivation had assumed a strong sense of personal agency (e.g., deCharms, 1968; White, 1959). Individuals were seen as spontaneously motivated to undertake a range of behaviors, including mastery of the world, exploration, and activities involving fun and enjoyment. However, the activities encompassed by theories of intrinsic motivation were limited. Although they included behaviors involving affiliation and interpersonal responsiveness, they did not encompass the many types of behaviors that individuals are not spontaneously inclined to undertake. Thus, for example, theories of intrinsic motivation did not apply in cases in which individuals are undertaking behavior that is not intrinsically interesting but merely socially expected, such as the behavior of completing an uninteresting homework assignment. In turn, early behaviorist theories (e.g., Hull, 1943; Skinner, 1953) were able to account for why individuals undertake the latter type of behavior by reference to the structure of reinforcement contingencies existing in the environment. However, they entailed a passive view of the person and thus could not explain how individuals come to experience a sense of agency and personal satisfaction in complying with social requirements.

Through its focus on processes of internalization, self-determination theory offered a model that bridged these two extremes and that succeeded in explaining how one could experience oneself as agentic even in the context of meeting social expectations (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1987, 1991). Self-determination theory assumes that individuals initially may be externally motivated to meet a social expectation because the behavior is socially required or because they will be sanctioned if they fail to perform it. However, gradually this expectation becomes internalized as the person makes it his or her own and comes subjectively to experience it as freely chosen. Once internalization has been achieved, the individual no longer experiences his or her behavior as motivated by social expectations but as based exclusively on his or her own subjective endorsement of it.

Self-determination theory speaks to the issue of balancing autonomy and relatedness in its views of motivation as forming a continuum of types. On one pole is intrinsic motivation, a form of motivation that explains autonomous behavior, but that may be considered, from the present perspective, to be insufficiently related, in that it does not account for compliance with social norms. On the other pole is external motivation, a form of motivation that emphasizes relatedness at the expense of autonomy, in portraying the individual as passively conforming to social norms. In this model, the optimum stance is identified as a middle position that integrates a perceived sense of choice with a commitment to meeting requirements of the social whole. In present terms, this represents a form of integration of autonomy and relatedness.

Parenting

One of the most influential contemporary psychological theories of parenting, the model of authoritarian parenting, developed by Baumrind, was responsive to historically shifting beliefs (Baumrind, 1966, 1971, 1996). An emphasis on the appropriateness of despotic rule by parents represented a widely held belief before the 20th century, with such an outlook evident in the writings of social theorists such as Rousseau, Hegel, and Mill. Children, it was assumed, need to be controlled by their elders and are incapable of self-determination. However, although providing control, this type of stance was emotionally harsh and domineering. It came to be challenged during the mid-20th century by perspectives that emphasize child permissiveness. Influenced by psychoanalytical views of the child's vulnerability, and spurred on by movements during the 1970s for extending greater rights to children, these latter approaches emphasized granting children maximum freedom of choice. However, they were subject to criticism themselves for failing to afford the child with needed guidance and protection.

The parenting model developed by Baumrind identifies an optimum midpoint between these two extremes. As Baumrind (1996) noted in describing the formation of her theory:

The authoritative model . . . rejects both extremes of the authoritarian-permissive (or conservative-liberal) polarity, representing instead an integration of opposing unbalanced childrearing positions. At one extreme, child-centered permissiveness high on responsiveness and low on demandingness . . . at the opposite extreme, restrictive parent-centered authoritarianism . . . Within the authoritative model, behavioral compliance and psychological autonomy are viewed not as mutually exclusive but rather as interdependent objectives: children are encouraged to respond habitually in pro-social ways and to reason autonomously. (p. 405)

Within the model of parenting developed by Baumrind, three contrasting styles of parenting are identified, reflecting these two opposing parenting philosophies and a stance that effects an integration of them. Overly harsh and restrictive styles of parenting are assumed to reflect an authoritarian style, whereas overly permissive and uninvolved styles of parenting are seen as reflecting a permissive style. The optimum stance of *authoritative* parenting constitutes a style that combines affective warmth and democratic decision making with provision of guidance and direction to the child.

The tripartite model of parenting developed by Baumrind may be seen to embody concerns with balancing autonomy and relatedness. Permissive styles of parenting, in affording the child inadequate guidance and not insuring the child's compliance with behavioral standards, promote the child's autonomy while embodying a deficit in relatedness. In turn, authoritarian styles of parenting, in being emotionally harsh and overcontrolling, embody an overemphasis on relatedness and an underemphasis on autonomy. Finally, the stance of authoritative parenting embodies the optimum approach in its balance of autonomy with relatedness, with the child encouraged to reason autonomously while being given active guidance in meeting societal standards.

Interpersonal Morality

In a final illustrative example, the morality of caring framework developed by Carol Gilligan represents the most influential contemporary theoretical model of interpersonal morality (Gilligan, 1977, 1982; Gilligan & Wiggins, 1988). Beyond its impact on the field of moral development, Gilligan's theory has stimulated the interest of feminist theorists as well as theorists of personality. The morality of caring model posits that individuals who have developed a morality of caring outlook feel a responsibility to care for needy individuals when they become aware of the others' needs and are able to help. This sense of moral responsibility is based on the individual having developed a connected view of self, in which they consider meeting the other's needs as integral to their self-identity. Although the morality of caring had originally been assumed to be gender-related, research has documented that it tends to be found among both men and women (Walker, 1984). The morality of caring orientation represents a freely given commitment that is compatible with individuality. The type of stance associated with this perspective is illustrated, for example, in the response of one of Gilligan's respondents who conveys her ideal image of a family as a setting in which "everyone is encouraged to become an individual and at the same time everybody helps others and receives help from them" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 54).

In terms of theories of moral judgment, Gilligan's model responded to theoretical gaps in the Kohlbergian model of moral development. Within

the Kohlbergian framework, it had been assumed that the content of morality is limited to issues of justice and that responsibilities to family and friends constitute forms of social conventional reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969, 1971). The Kohlbergian framework thus emphasized individual autonomy, but only in the context of a morality of justice, and gave weight to interpersonal responsibilities but only in the context of a social conformist stance. Within Gilligan's model, in contrast, interpersonal responsiveness and caring are not only treated as fully moral, they are approached in ways that place greater emphasis on the individual's personal decision making than is the case in approaches based on role obligations.

In terms of the development of a morality of caring outlook, individuals are seen as first experiencing a phase in which their focus is on caring for themselves. This is followed, in turn, by a phase in which emphasis is placed on "caring for others," to the individual's "exclusion of herself," a stance that is overly selfless. Finally, a fully developed morality of caring stance is achieved during which the individual has resolved "the tension between selfishness and responsibility," giving concern both to the needs of self and to those of others (Gilligan, 1982, p. 74).

The morality of caring framework embodies an emphasis on balancing autonomy and relatedness in its views of the path and endpoint of development. To achieve a mature morality of caring outlook, the individual is seen as first passing through a developmental phase characterized by a selfish stance that reflects too much autonomy, followed by a selfless stance that reflects too much relatedness. The mature morality of caring position integrates autonomy with relatedness through combining caring for the self with caring for others.

Summary and Implications

In sum, it is evident that major contemporary theories of social development in the areas of attachment, social motivation, parenting, and interpersonal morality share a common deep structure that is responsive to problems in balancing autonomy with relatedness. This deep structure may be seen to function in a way that is similar to that observed in the case of the construct of *g* that underlies diverse theories of intelligence. The various theories of social development forward viewpoints in which the most adaptive form is portrayed as a balanced position that integrates the concerns with autonomy and relatedness. This structure maps onto the problem in achieving agency, identified by Bakan (1966), and resonates with various Western individualist cultural themes. In a similar way, the content definition of intelligence reflected in the construct of *g* privileges characteristics that are also highly valued in Western cultural settings, such as an emphasis on abstract analytical abilities and on response speed.

Paralleling the high intercorrelations observed among different IQ type measures, the diverse theories of social development also show positive correlation with each other. Thus, for example, it has been found that an authoritative style of parenting is associated with a self-determined motivational stance (e.g., Grolnick & Ryan, 1989; Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997) and is linked to the development of secure forms of attachment (e.g., Bretherton, Golby, & Cho, 1997; LaGuardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000; Leak & Cooney, 2001). Equally, just as high IQ predicts a range of positive adaptive outcomes, the optimum modes of social development identified are likewise related to similar types of positive consequences. For example, authoritarian styles of parenting, secure modes of attachment, and self-determined motivational orientations are associated with higher educational attainment, positive work performance, as well as positive health behaviors and effects, such as lower levels of alcohol use and depression (Baumrind, 1996; Grusec & Kuczynski, 1997). Of equal importance, as is also the case with IQ measures, positive adaptive outcomes in the area of social development are consistently linked to higher socioeconomic status.

TOWARD A CULTURAL BROADENING OF THEORIES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In the following section, discussion focuses on cultural research that points to contrasting problems for the self as assuming a prominent role in everyday adaptation in diverse cultural contexts and that highlights the need to expand present theoretical models of social development to accommodate this variation. The purpose of this type of research resembles that being undertaken by cultural theorists in the area of intelligence who likewise are working to broaden the types of abilities taken into account in models of intelligence (e.g., Grigorenko et al., 2001; Schliemann et al., 1997). The evidence on social development considered here is from a range of cultural populations that each emphasize somewhat distinctive outlooks. Accordingly, it may be seen, the types of underlying problems for the self that appear salient also are somewhat distinctive from each other, even as they differ from the middle-class European American outlooks privileged in contemporary mainstream psychology.

Cultural Variation in Forms of Attachment

Cross-cultural research conducted by attachment researchers has uncovered what appears to be a universal preference for secure over insecure forms of attachment as well as has established links between attachment and desired adaptive endpoints (Crittenden & Clausen, 2000; Sagi, 1990; Waters & Cummings, 2000). However, increasingly cultural work that is sensi-

tive to indigenous cultural categories is suggesting that attachment theory fails to capture certain dimensions of attachment that are salient in various collectivist cultural populations.

Evidence for the latter claim may be seen in research that explored the meanings that groups of mothers give to attachment behavior (Harwood, Miller, & Irizarry, 1995). Asked to describe the qualities that they would like their toddlers to emphasize as they grow older, European American mothers spontaneously mentioned themes involving balancing autonomy and relatedness, dimensions that are central to attachment theory. Such an emphasis may be seen, for example, in the sample responses by European American mothers given below:

I'd like him to be independent and love us, but stand on his own.

I want her to be independent, but yet, you know it's good to have other people around to be with and stuff. (Harwood et al., 1995, p. 89)

In contrast, in describing their images of an ideal child, Puerto Rican mothers spontaneously focused on the child developing such qualities as being calm, obedient, and respectfully attentive to the teaching of their elders. As seen in the descriptions given below by Puerto Rican mothers, emphasis within this community tends to be placed on the child coming to know what is expected in particular situations and behaving in appropriate ways to gain the respect of others:

I would love it if they were . . . *respetuosos* (respectful) toward their elders as well as with people their own age, so that when they're adolescents and then adults, they know how to use particular aspects of their personality at the appropriate time, so that others will *respetar* them.

I would like for my son to be *respetuoso*, *amable*, *obediente*. I would like him to be that way so that one does not have to have a hard time (dealing) with the boy. (Harwood et al., p. 98)

It is notable that when presented with experimental vignette situations that portrayed toddlers displaying the three forms of attachment tapped in the Strange Situation research paradigm, the European American mothers interpreted these situations in ways that are congruent with attachment theory. They spontaneously admired the B type baby for being secure, while criticizing the A type baby for emotional detachment, and the C type baby for excessive dependence. In contrast, the Puerto Rican mothers spontaneously applied contrasting criteria in appraising the hypothetical toddlers. Thus, for example, the A type toddler was criticized for what the Puerto Rican mothers interpreted to be an overly active and insufficiently calm mode of behavior, whereas the C type toddler was criticized for what was perceived as a willful and pampered stance. In turn, the B type toddler was praised for what the Puerto Rican mothers regarded as a stance that reflected respectful attentiveness and positive engagement in interpersonal relationships.

Such results imply that there are salient culturally variable dimensions of attachment that are not tapped by existing measuring instruments. Although the Puerto Rican mothers showed an overall preference for the B form of attachment, they attended to dimensions of behavior, namely proper demeanor and positive engagement with the environment, that are not captured in attachment theory.

Similar observations underlie calls to broaden definitions of attachment theory to encompass concerns with *amae* (an emotional experience that involves positive feelings of depending on another's benevolence) that are salient in Japanese cultural contexts (Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000; Rothbaum, Weisz, Pott, Miyake, & Morelli, 2000; Takahashi, 1990). Thus, in contrast to the types of orientations emphasized in attachment theory, Japanese normative assumptions place greater value on the child's development of empathy as well as stress parental practices that reflect greater parental emotional involvement as compared with verbal involvement.

In sum, cultural research on attachment does not challenge the universality of the distinction between secure and insecure behavior but rather suggests that the dimension of security of attachment is not fully adequate to tap salient aspects of attachment that are emphasized in different cultural contexts. The concerns with empathy, interdependence, and indulgence of the other's needs that are salient in the stance of *amae* are notably not the same as the concerns with maintaining respect, tranquility, and compliance that are salient in the stance of proper relatedness emphasized by Puerto Rican mothers. However, in both instances, the salient dimensions being emphasized do not readily map onto the concerns with balancing autonomy and relatedness that inform contemporary attachment theory.

Cultural Variation in Social Motivation

Cross-cultural research that has used scales developed in the tradition of self-determination theory provides support for the claims of this model (Deci, Ryan, Gagne, Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2001). It has been demonstrated that if social expectations assume a controlling form, they are experienced as aversive and associated with negative motivational implications. However, research is also revealing that in many collectivist cultural populations, individuals do not tend to experience role-based social expectations as controlling. Thus, in such cases, acting to fulfill role obligations is not associated with the negative implications typically observed among European American populations and predicted by self-determination theory.

Providing evidence for this type of cross-cultural difference, Bontempo, Lobel, and Triandis (1990) found that compared with Americans, Brazilians reported that they would experience more enjoyment in being responsive to need-based role expectations (e.g., fulfilling a request by a family member for a loan). The results indicated that Brazilians fully internalize social norms of

this type, whereas Americans tend to experience them as controlling. As Bontempo and his colleagues observe, "unlike their Brazilian counterparts who may derive a sense of satisfaction from acting dutifully, the more individualistic U.S. sample reports little satisfaction with this 'forced' behavior" (Bontempo et al., 1990, p. 207).

Similar types of trends were documented in a study that contrasted the outlooks on helping behaviors held by European American as compared with Hindu Indian adults (Miller & Bersoff, 1995). This latter work demonstrated that Hindu Indians not only consider it more desirable than do Americans to respond to the needs of family members in situations involving high cost, but also indicate that they would experience such behavior as more satisfying. The nature of this cross-cultural difference may be illustrated through a contrast of responses given in the case of a situation involving a wife providing extended care for her husband who was paralyzed in a motorcycle accident. Focusing on the dissatisfaction that she expected that the wife would experience, a U.S. participant portrayed the wife's duty to her husband as antithetical to her individual satisfaction: "She is acting out of obligation—not other reasons like love. She has a sense of duty, but little satisfaction for her own happiness" (Miller & Bersoff, 1995, p. 275). The U.S. respondent, it may be seen, is adopting an outlook that treats individual satisfaction and duty as antithetical elements, the same type of assumption informing self-determination theory and underlying the opposition between the poles of autonomy and relatedness that has been seen informing psychological theories of motivation. In contrast, in a prototypical response, an Indian informant associated duty with the fulfillment of role obligations: "She will have the satisfaction of having fulfilled her duty. She helped her husband during difficulty."

Related experimental research suggests that in many collectivist cultural populations duty does not reflect a form of internalization in which a sense of obligation disappears as a constraint is internalized but rather a form of internalization in which motivation is simultaneously experienced as endogenously and exogenously generated (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). In a between-participants manipulation, European American and Hindu Indian respondents made attributions about the motives of hypothetical agents who were portrayed as providing aid to a neighbor either in the context of prior reciprocity or in their absence. The attributions of Americans conformed to the predictions of self-determination theory, with greater liking for helping and satisfaction inferred to be present in the condition in which behavior was less normatively based than in the experimental condition. In contrast, Indians considered the agents equally endogenously motivated in both conditions. Such a trend suggested that they saw less of a tension between individual inclinations and social expectations than did Americans but rather instead viewed social expectations as compatible with individual satisfaction.

Experimental work by Iyengar and Lepper (1999) documents similar types of cross-cultural differences on a behavioral level. Consonant with the emphasis on freely chosen behavior predicted by self-determination theory, European American children were found to perform better and to display greater intrinsic motivation when they had selected an anagram task themselves as compared with when their mothers had selected it for them. In contrast, Asian American children performed better when complying with the wishes of their mothers.

Overall, the present findings point to the existence of a form of motivation not anticipated in self-determination theory. Self-determination theory posits that the tension between freely chosen behavior and normatively directed behavior (i.e., which in present terms is seen as mapping onto the deep structure of the tension between autonomy and relatedness) is resolved through a middle position in which social expectations have been internalized so that they are subjectively experienced as purely internal. However, the results observed among the present collectivist populations highlight the existence of a form of internalization in which behavior is experienced as simultaneously endogenously and exogenously motivated (i.e. as guided by external norms and as expressions of the self).

Cultural Variation in Parenting

Comparative research supports the claims of the Baumrind model that extremes of parenting behavior—that is, stances that are experienced as overly harsh and punitive or ones that are insufficiently involved—are associated with maladaptive child outcomes (Chen, Liu, Li, Cen, Chen, & Wang, 2000). However, work has also documented that the meanings accorded to and adaptive implications of parenting behaviors vary in different cultural communities, with such variation not fully accommodated by the categories of Baumrind's parenting model (e.g., Rudy & Grusec, 2001).

Research demonstrates, for example, that in the context of neighborhoods that are highly impoverished or dangerous, a style of parenting that is restrictive may be associated with positive adaptive outcomes. In such cases, close monitoring of the child's behavior serves to provide the child with needed supervision and support that is less necessary in more benign environmental contexts. It is notable that this work also suggests that the present definition of authoritarian parenting is not fully adequate to capture the nature of this normatively preferred form, because this directive form that is found in certain inner city communities, tends to be associated with perceived parental warmth rather than with perceived parental harshness, as is the case with authoritarian parenting.

Cross-cultural research has also demonstrated that unlike European American adolescents, Korean adolescents associate greater perceived parental warmth with greater perceived parental control (Rohner & Pettengill,

1985). Of equal importance, researchers have found that the controlling styles of parenting that tend to be emphasized within Chinese families are informed by an indigenous concept of training (*chiao shun*). Such an orientation combines an emphasis on standards of conduct and preserving the integrity of the family with affective concern and caring for the child. Not only is this directive form of parenting accorded positive rather than negative affective meanings within this community, but it is also associated with positive adaptive outcomes such as higher levels of educational achievement.

It is notable that cultural research also has suggested that within Swedish and Nordic cultural communities, the parenting practices represent a blend of forms that do not readily fit into one of the types in the Baumrind typology. Nordic parents make less use of physical punishments than their U.S. counterparts, but also less use of reasoning and more use of physical restraint (Baumrind, 1996).

In sum, there is evidence of a distinction made between adaptive and abusive or maladaptive parenting in all cultural populations. However, available research suggests that normatively acceptable modes of parenting are not fully captured by the Baumrind scheme, with its identification of an ideal midpoint that combines democratic decision making (autonomy) with effective social control (relatedness). Rather, the forms of parenting that are normative in different cultural communities appear responsive to contrasting ecological conditions as well as to contrasting cultural values, such as emphases on family harmony or on nonviolence, that do not readily gloss onto this continuum.

Cultural Variation in Interpersonal Morality

Concerns with caring have been observed to be central to morality universally (Snarey & Keljo, 1991). However, cross-cultural research also reveals the existence of cultural variation in forms of interpersonal morality and suggests that the voluntaristic approach to caring of Gilligan's model is culturally specific (Miller, 1994, 2001; Shimizu, 2001).

Rather than reflecting a concern with balancing responsibilities to self (autonomy) with responsibilities to others (relatedness), forms of interpersonal morality found in many collectivist cultural populations place greater emphasis on fulfillment of role-related responsibilities. In such traditions, role-related responsibilities tend to be approached as approximations of the nature of being or as a perceived natural law, rather than as a mere societal construction. For example, it has been found that moral outlooks emphasized within certain Chinese populations reflect the construct of *jen*, an outlook that merges ideas of fulfillment of duty and respect for authority with benevolence and love (Dien, 1982; Ma, 1997) and that within Japanese communities caring tends to be viewed as a communal responsibility, extending beyond individual cognitions and feelings (Shimizu, 2001). In turn, work

within Hindu Indian communities has documented the centrality to interpersonal moral outlooks of the construct of *dharma*, a concept that denotes simultaneously inherent disposition, nature, code for conduct, and natural law (Miller, 1994; Vasudev, 1994; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987). In another example, studies conducted among Buddhist monks have highlighted the foundation of interpersonal moral commitments in that community on meta-physical cultural premises grounded in *dharma*, or a view of life as suffering and of negative karma as accumulating through transgressions (Huebner & Garrod, 1991, 1993). From such a perspective, there is assumed to be a moral imperative that is central to the self's spiritual advancement to act to eliminate the suffering of others and to overcome the effects of negative accumulated karma.

Cross-cultural research conducted among European American and Hindu Indian populations demonstrates that these contrasting moral outlooks give rise to cultural variation in the morality of caring. For example, Hindu Indians show a greater tendency to treat meeting the needs of family and friends as role-related duties, whereas European Americans show a greater tendency to treat them as matters for personal decision making (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). Furthermore, Hindu Indians are more prone than European Americans to consider it as morally required, rather than beyond the scope of morality, to give priority to the needs of family, friends, or other in-group members in the face of personal hardship or sacrifice (Miller & Bersoff, 1995). Also, whereas European Americans tend to judge that there is less responsibility to help a family member or friend with whom one does not have a close relationship, Hindu Indians tend to treat interpersonal responsibilities as independent of such nonmoral considerations (Miller & Bersoff, 1998).

Overall, the perspectives on interpersonal morality under consideration here do not embody the same type of cultural tension that it was argued informs Gilligan's morality of caring model. The collective tends generally to be conceptualized in less problematic terms, as a natural and omnipresent aspect of experience that is integral to self, rather than as a discretionary commitment to be balanced against the needs and desires of an autonomous individual.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In sum, this chapter has shown that similar conceptual assumptions underlie contemporary mainstream psychological theories of social development. These assumptions concern achieving a balance between autonomy and relatedness in different spheres of social life. This deep conceptual structure is evident in the tendencies within the theories to identify problematic adaptive endpoints at opposing ends of an autonomy-relatedness continuum and to identify the optimum adaptive form at the midpoint of this continuum as a stance that achieves a balance between these two poles.

However, I have also presented evidence suggesting that approaches that are informed by this deep structure do not appear adequate to accommodate the somewhat contrasting perspectives in these areas emphasized in different sociocultural communities. Although contrasting themes are salient in different settings, certain common tendencies were observed. Thus, for example, there appears a broad theme related to responding appropriately to features of the social context. Such a stance was seen in the emphasis placed by Puerto Rican mothers on their children's display of both respect and affection toward their elders or in the emphasis placed on training among Chinese parents. Furthermore, this concern with social responsiveness tends to be regarded as a fulfillment of self as a social and spiritual being. Thus, as evident in the case of Hindu and Buddhist outlooks on morality, responsiveness to the needs of others is understood metaphysically as a vehicle for spiritual refinement, which represents an expression of the self even as it also represents a response to social requirements.

These multiple types of normatively based visions of social development do not appear readily to fit into a dichotomous formulation marked by a tension between the individual and the group. Rather, in distinct and variable ways, the various visions tend to reflect monistic outlooks, in which the fulfillment of social requirements and of self tends to be experienced as co-terminous. Of equal importance, the perceived challenge is to cultivate the self through social relatedness rather than to preserve the self's autonomy while meeting the somewhat competing demands of the social order.

In terms of implications, the existence of a common deep structure in contemporary theories of social development suggests that such theories suffer from some of the same concerns with limited predictive range and circularity that have been raised in the case of theories of intelligence. It becomes expected on conceptual grounds alone that measures of social development based on the autonomy-relatedness framework will correlate with each other, just as measures of intelligence that are informed by a common psychometrically based conception of intelligence also tend to correlate with each other. Also, to the extent that an emphasis on balancing autonomy and relatedness reflects central values of the middle-class European American power structure that informs many societal institutions, such as schools and corporations, it will tend to be rewarded with positive evaluations and opportunities for advancement. In this respect, such a normative standard for competence becomes a gatekeeping mechanism similar in many respects to that observed in the case of IQ.

The present considerations more generally highlight the need to broaden present theories of social development and their associated measuring instruments to accommodate diverse cultural and subcultural outlooks, just as similar calls have been made to broaden the scope of abilities encompassed within theories of intelligence. The goal is not to expand the number of explanatory frameworks so that theories are formulated at a level of specific-

ity that applies only to an isolated cultural or social group. Rather, it is to recognize that important variation in modes of adaptation exists that is not being taken into account in contemporary psychological theories and research methodologies (Miller, 2002). Such an expansion holds the promise of contributing to basic psychological theory, through its introduction of new theoretical constructs and process models of development.

It is important methodologically to recognize that our present assessment instruments lack sufficient cultural sensitivity and need to be made more culturally inclusive, just as intelligence tests likewise need to be adapted to tap the competencies of diverse cultural populations (Greenfield, 1997). It was observed, for example, that in several cases, theories of social development appeared to be supported when existing measuring instruments were administered in comparative cultural research. For instance, in the area of attachment, culturally based research that presented individuals with the three attachment categories from the Strange Situation paradigm has revealed a universal preference for secure over insecure forms of attachment (Harwood et al., 1995). Of equal importance, cross-cultural researchers using measuring instruments developed in the tradition of self-determination theory have documented a universal preference for identified over controlling motivational orientations (Deci et al., 2001).

However, in cases such as these, identifications are being observed that may be considered only best-guess glosses, as respondents are confronted with research questionnaires that typically do not tap the subtlety of the types of orientations emphasized in their respective communities. For example, the type of respectful and affectionate child valued by Puerto Rican mothers does not closely match the type of secure and independent child that is considered most adaptive within the Strange Situation research paradigm. However, the positive connotations accorded to this child fit the secure category of attachment much more closely than they do either of the two less adaptive patterns that are presented as alternatives in the Strange Situation research paradigm. Likewise, the endogenous view of duty that is entailed in social motivation among Hindu Indian populations tends to be linked with satisfaction even as it is also regarded as based on duty. It is likely then that a Hindu Indian respondent would find that this type of outlook fits most closely the identified orientation on scales in the tradition of self-determination theory, given the positive affective connotations of the items that comprise the identified orientation on such scales and the predominately negative affective connotations of the items that comprise the external orientation. However, although Hindu Indians might thus show results on self-determination measures that are identical to those shown by Americans, this response commonality would obscure important cultural variation that exists in Hindu Indian as compared with European American outlooks. A similar conclusion, it may be noted, follows from cultural work in the area of intelligence. This work has documented that frequently only a partial overlap ex-

ists between the operational definitions of intelligence on IQ tests and the ways that intelligence is defined in local cultural communities. Although IQ tests then may appear to have universal validity, they are not sufficiently sensitive to tap these local salient outlooks on intelligence.

In conclusion, it must be recognized that in all cultural populations, distinctions are made between behaviors that are considered to be more or less adaptive and that, at the extremes, considerable cross-cultural agreement exists concerning what constitutes extremely maladaptive forms of social and intellectual development. However, beyond this commonality there tends to be more openness in pathways of normal human development than is taken into account in contemporary psychological theories. Just as there are multiple culturally variable criteria of what constitutes intelligence, there are multiple culturally variable criteria of what constitutes competent social development. Psychological theories of social development and of intelligence must be broadened to accommodate this variation, with the recognition that the normative endpoints of human development are multiple and cannot be captured by the values and practices of any single group.

REFERENCES

- Ainsworth, M. D. (1978). *Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Bakan, D. (1966). *The duality of human existence*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Baumrind, D. (1966). Effects of authoritative parental control on child behavior. *Child Development*, 37, 887-907.
- Baumrind, D. (1971). Current patterns of parental authority. *Developmental Psychology Monographs*, 4(1, Part 2).
- Baumrind, D. (1996). The discipline controversy revisited. *Family Relations: Journal of Applied Family & Child Studies*, 45, 405-414.
- Bontempo, R., Lobel, S., & Triandis, H. (1990). Compliance and value internalization in Brazil and the U.S. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 21, 200-213.
- Bowlby, J. (1969-1980). *Attachment and loss*. New York: Basic Books.
- Bretherton, I., Golby, B., & Cho, E. (1997). Attachment and the transmission of values. In J. E. Grusec & L. Kuczynski (Eds.), *Parenting and children's internalization of values: A handbook of contemporary theory* (pp. 103-134). New York: Wiley.
- Ceci, S. J. (1990). *On intelligence . . . more or less*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Charlesworth, W. (1976). Human intelligence as adaptation: An ecological approach. In L. Resnick (Ed.), *The nature of intelligence*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Chen, X., Liu, M., Li, B., Cen, G., Chen, H., & Wang, L. (2000). Maternal authoritative and authoritarian attitudes and mother-child interactions and relationships in urban China. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 24(1), 119-126.

- Crittenden, P. M., & Claussen, A. H. (2000). *The organization of attachment relationships: Maturation, culture, and context*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- deCharms, R. (1968). *Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior*. New York: Academic Press.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). *Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1987). The support of autonomy and the control of behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 1024-1037.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation: Vol. 38. Perspectives on motivation* (pp. 237-288). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Deci, E. L., Ryan, R. M., Gagne, M., Leone, D. R., Usunov, J., & Komarova, B. P. (2001). Need satisfaction, motivation, and well-being in the work organizations of a former Eastern Block country. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 930-942.
- Dien, D. S.-F. (1982). A Chinese perspective on Kohlberg's theory of moral development. *Developmental Review*, 2, 331-341.
- Eysenck, H. (1979). A model for intelligence. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Farr, R. M. (1991). Individualism as a collective representation. In V. Aebischer, J. P. Deconchy, & M. Lipiansky (Eds.), *Ideologies et representations sociales*. Cosset (Fribourg), Switzerland: Delval.
- Fraley, R. C. (2002). Attachment stability from infancy to adulthood: Meta-analysis and dynamic modeling of developmental mechanisms. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6(2), 123-151.
- Gardner, H. (1983). *Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gardner, H. (1993). *Multiple intelligences: The theory in practice*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gilligan, C. (1977). In a different voice: Women's conceptions of self and of morality. *Harvard Educational Review*, 47, 481-517.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gilligan, C., & Wiggins, G. (1988). The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. In C. Gilligan, J. Ward, & J. Taylor (Eds.), *Mapping the moral domain: A contribution of women's thinking to psychological theory and education* (pp. 111-138). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Greenfield, P. M. (1997). You can't take it with you: Why ability assessments don't cross cultures. *American Psychologist*, 52, 1115-1124.
- Grigorenko, E., Geisler, P. W., Prince, R., Okatcha, F., Nokes, C., Kenny, D. A., et al. (2001). The organisation of Luo conceptions of intelligence: A study of implicit theories in a Kenyan village. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 25, 367-378.
- Grolnick, W. S., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1997). Internalization within the family: The self-determination theory perspective. In J. E. Grusec & L. Kuczynski (Eds.), *Handbook of parenting and the transmission of values* (pp. 135-161). New York: Wiley.
- Grolnick, W. S., & Ryan, R. M. (1989). Parent styles associated with children's self-regulation and competence in school. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 81, 143-154.
- Grusec, J. E., & Kuczynski, L. (Eds.). (1997). *Parenting and children's internalization of values: A handbook of contemporary theory*. New York: Wiley.
- Guisinger, S., & Blatt, S. J. (1994). Individuality and relatedness: Evolution of a fundamental debate. *American Psychologist*, 49, 104-111.
- Hartigan, J. A., & Wigdor, A. K. (Eds.). (1989). *Fairness in employment testing: Validity, generality, minority issues, and the General Aptitude Test Battery*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Harwood, R. L., Miller, J. G., & Iritany, N. L. (1995). *Culture and attachment: Perceptions of the child in context*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Haslam, N., & Baron, J. (1994). Intelligence, personality, and prudence. In R. J. Sternberg & P. Ruzgis (Eds.), *Personality and intelligence* (pp. 32-58). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huebner, A., & Garrod, A. C. (1991). Moral reasoning in a Karmic world. *Human Development*, 34, 341-352.
- Huebner, A. M., & Garrod, A. C. (1993). Moral reasoning among Tibetan Monks: A study of Buddhist adolescents and young adults in Nepal. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 24(2), 167-185.
- Hull, C. L. (1943). *Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Hunt, E. (1995). *Will we be smart enough: Cognitive changes in the coming workforce*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hunter, J. E. (1986). Cognitive ability, cognitive aptitudes, job knowledge, and job performance. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 29, 340-362.
- Iskoff, S. W. (1989). *The making of the civilized mind*. New York: Peter Longmans.
- Iyengar, S. S., & Lepper, M. R. (1999). Rethinking the value of choice: A cultural perspective on intrinsic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76, 349-366.
- Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), *Handbook of socialization theory* (pp. 347-380). Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), *Cognitive development and epistemology* (pp. 151-236). New York: Academic Press.
- Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition. (1983). *Culture and cognitive development*. In W. Kessen & P. H. Mussen (Eds.), *Handbook of child psychology: History, theory and method* (pp. 295-356). New York: Wiley.
- LaGuardia, J. G., Ryan, R. M., Couchman, C. E., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Within-person variation in security of attachment: A self-determination theory per-

- spective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 367-384.
- Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). *Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Leak, G. K., & Cooney, R. R. (2001). Self-determination, attachment styles, and well-being in adult romantic relationships. *Representative Research in Social Psychology*, 25, 55-62.
- Ma, H. K. (1997). The affective and cognitive aspects of moral development: A Chinese perspective. In H. Kao & D. Sinha (Eds.), *Asian perspectives on psychology* (pp. 93-109). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Miller, J. G. (1994). Cultural diversity in the morality of caring: Individually oriented versus duty-based interpersonal moral codes. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 28(1), 3-39.
- Miller, J. G. (1997). A cultural-psychology perspective on intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & E. L. Grigorenko (Eds.), *Intelligence, heredity, and environment* (pp. 269-302). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, J. G. (2001). Culture and moral development. In D. Matsumoto (Ed.), *The handbook of culture and psychology* (pp. 151-169). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, J. G. (2002). Bringing culture to basic psychological theory—Beyond individualism and collectivism: Comment on Oyserman et al. (2002). *Psychological Bulletin*, 128, 97-109.
- Miller, J. G., & Bersoff, D. M. (1992). Culture and moral judgment: How are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62, 541-554.
- Miller, J. G., & Bersoff, D. M. (1994). Cultural influences on the moral status of reciprocity and the discounting of endogenous motivation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 20, 592-602.
- Miller, J. G., & Bersoff, D. M. (1995). Development in the context of everyday family relationships: Culture, interpersonal morality, and adaptation. In M. Killen & D. Hart (Eds.), *Morality in everyday life: Developmental perspectives* (pp. 259-282). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, J. G., & Bersoff, D. M. (1998). The role of liking in perceptions of the moral responsibility to help: A cultural perspective. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 34, 443-469.
- Miller, J. G., Bersoff, D. M., & Harwood, R. L. (1990). Perceptions of social responsibilities in India and in the United States: Moral imperatives or personal decisions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 33-47.
- Pintner, R. (1921). Contribution to "Intelligence and its Measurement: A Symposium." *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 12, 139-143.
- Plath, D. W. (1980). *Long engagements: Maturity in modern Japan*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Rohner, R. P. & Pettengill, S. M. (1985). Perceived parental acceptance-rejection and parental control among Korean adolescents. *Child Development*, 52, 524-528.
- Rosaldo, M. A. (1984). Toward an anthropology of self and feeling. In R. A. Shweder & R. A. LeVine (Eds.), *Culture theory: Essays on mind, self, and emotion* (pp. 137-157). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rothbaum, F., Pott, M., Azuma, H., Miyake, K., & Weisz, J. (2000). The development of close relationships in Japan and the United States: Paths of symbiotic harmony and generative tension. *Child Development*, 71, 1121-1142.
- Rothbaum, F., Weisz, J., Pott, M., Miyake, K., & Morelli, G. (2000). Attachment and culture: Security in the United States and Japan. *American Psychologist*, 55, 1093-1104.
- Rudy, D., & Grusec, J. E. (2001). Correlates of authoritarian parenting in individualist and collectivist cultures and implications for understanding the transmission of values. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 202-212.
- Sagi, A. (1990). Attachment theory and research from a cross-cultural perspective. *Human Development*, 33, 10-22.
- Schliemann, A. D., Carraher, D. W., & Ceci, S. J. (1997). Everyday cognition. In *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology: Vol. 2. Basic processes and human development* (2nd ed., pp. 177-216). Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Scribner, S. (1984). Studying working intelligence. In B. Rogoff & J. Lave (Eds.), *Everyday cognition: Its development in social context* (pp. 9-40). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shimizu, H. (2001). Japanese adolescent boys' senses of empathy (*omoiyari*) and Carol Gilligan's perspectives on the morality of care: A phenomenological approach. *Culture and Psychology*, 7, 453-475.
- Skinner, B. F. (1953). *Science and human behavior*. New York: Macmillan.
- Snarey, J., & Keljo, K. (1991). In a Gemeinschaft voice: The cross-cultural expansion of moral development theory. In *Handbook of moral behavior and development: Vol. 1. Theory* (pp. 395-424). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Spence, J. T. (1985). Achievement American style: The rewards and costs of individualism. *American Psychologist*, 40, 1285-1295.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1985). *Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1988). *The triarchic mind: A new theory of human intelligence*. New York: Viking Press.
- Sternberg, R. J. (1996). *Successful intelligence: How practical and creative intelligence determine success in life*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Sternberg, R. J., Conway, B. E., Ketron, J. L., & Bernstein, M. (1981). People's conceptions of intelligence. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 41, 37-55.
- Takahashi, K. (1990). Are the key assumptions of the "strange situation" procedure universal? A view from Japanese research. *Human Development*, 33, 23-30.
- Taylor, C. (1989). *Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Vasudev, J. (1994). Ahimsa, justice, and the unity of life: Postconventional morality from an Indian perspective. In M. E. Miller (Ed.), *Transcendence and mature*

thought in adulthood: The further reaches of adult development (pp. 237-255). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Vasudev, J., & Hummel, R. C. (1987). Moral stage sequence and principled reasoning in an Indian sample. *Human Development*, 30(2), 105-118.

Walker, L. J. (1984). Sex differences in the development of moral reasoning: A critical review. *Child Development*, 55, 677-691.

Waters, E., & Cummings, E. M. (2000). A secure base from which to explore close relationships. *Child Development*, 71(1), 164-172.

White, R. W. (1959). Motivation reconsidered: The concept of competence. *Psychological Review*, 66, 297-333.

6

CULTURE AND COGNITION: PERFORMANCE DIFFERENCES AND INVARIANT STRUCTURES

YPE H. POOKTINGA AND FONS J. R. VAN DE VIJVER

Cross-cultural differences in score distributions of cognitive tasks are often substantial. Such findings are of practical significance; high scores on intelligence tests reflect skills or competencies that tend to be an asset for educational and economic advancement, at least in urban industrial settings. The present chapter focuses on the challenge these results offer for theoretical analysis. In our view the relationship between culture and cognition is a fascinating field of study. However, research often yields differences that are difficult to interpret. Do differences in Raven scores (Raven, 1938) obtained with children from different countries reflect differences in reasoning, as we are often inclined to conclude? And what is the role of educational differences? Do children learn to reason better in school or does their everyday environment make them more familiar with the abstract figures and tasks of the Raven? In our view these questions are too infrequently dealt with. We question the wisdom of uncritically interpreting observed differences as reflecting differences in the traits the tests are supposed to measure, without examining the validity of the interpretation. In particular, if participants come from rather dissimilar cultures it is very easy to find (replicable) significant